

Building Partner Capacity



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On the cover. Afghan Commandos report their findings to a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha team leader during a dismounted patrol in 2010. U.S. Army Photo by Spc. Ryan Goldsmith.



Building Partner Capacity

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Foreword

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance of the United States places a heavy reliance on building partnership capacity (BPC) for U.S. national security. The author of this monograph, Dr. Rich Yarger, clearly sees BPC as a strategic necessity for reasons far beyond the current resource issues. He contends that BPC is an essential strategic concept for any practical U.S. grand strategy going forward based on the U.S. need for a positive competing world order. He addresses the questions of how SOF and others might think strategically about BPC in the 21st century environment and the implications of such thinking.

In order to best develop this grand concept, he maintains that decision makers, strategists, and planners need to comprehend and develop a high level of strategic understanding and be able to distinguish between cooperation, partnering, and strategic partnerships among states and other international actors. Once this is realized, he argues, the proper focus of BPC becomes evident, and the lessons in regard to capacity building from the last two decades become much clearer.

While recognizing the Joint Force and all the services and agencies play important roles in this larger picture of BPC, he reasons that USSOCOM and SOF are presented with unique opportunities and challenges in pursuit of the grand strategy. How USSOCOM deals with these will determine the SOF contribution to the grand strategy, and perhaps its ultimate success or failure.

There are multiple ways of viewing the role of BPC as part of a U.S. grand or defense strategy and the place of SOF in these strategies. A healthy discussion and a great deal of change are ongoing. The ideas presented herein contribute to this discussion and further inform various perspectives and levels of consideration.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.
Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

About the Author

Harry R. (Rich) Yarger, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University and recently served as the Ministry Reform Analyst in the Security, Reconstruction and Transition Division of the Peace-keeping & Stability Operations Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He has been associated with JSOU for more than a decade.

Prior to joining the Institute in September 2009, he served as Professor of National Security Policy in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College where he held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and taught courses in: Fundamentals of Strategic Thinking; Theory of War and Strategy; National Security Policy and Strategy; Grand Strategy; Terrorism; and the Interagency. His research focuses on strategic theory, national security policy and strategy, terrorism, irregular warfare, effective governance, and the education and development of strategic level leaders.



In addition to teaching positions, he served five years as the Chairman of the Army War College's Department of Distance Education. Dr. Yarger has also taught at the undergraduate level at several colleges. His book, *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century*, was released by Praeger Security International in July 2008. An edited work, *Short of General War: Perspectives on the Use of Military Power in the 21st Century*, was published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in 2010. "How Students Learn Strategy?", a chapter in *Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response*, was also an SSI release. A second edited text, *Transitions: Issues, Challenges and Solutions in International Assistance*, was released in 2011. His most recent monograph, *21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations*, was published by JSOU in April 2013.

A retired Army colonel, Dr. Yarger is a Vietnam veteran and served in both Germany and Korea. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and obtained his doctorate in history from Temple University with fields in U.S. military history, U.S. diplomatic history, European Diplomatic history, and American social history.

Introduction

... [I]t is important that we ... have trusted, dependable relationships and partners out there that we can work with and we can depend upon – General Joseph Votel, commander, USSOCOM¹

The unfolding 21st century is not what most U.S. policymakers and many military professionals foresaw at the time of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. After more than two decades of nearly continuous conflict and great expenditures in blood and treasure, U.S. civilian and military leadership have come to recognize that stability in the 21st century requires an international network of strategic partners and others who share interests in a global environment of relative peace characterized by a free exchange of commerce and ideas. Under the conditions of rapid and continued globalization, the lynchpin of the emerging United States grand strategy is building partnership capacity (BPC), and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are instrumental in the pursuit of a successful BPC policy.² However, the best use of special operations capabilities in a BPC strategy cannot be determined or achieved without a clear understanding of the strategic imperatives demanding such a strategy and the factors that shape how best to pursue it.

Capacity building in allies and others is not a new concept for U.S. policy or strategies. It is evident in most of the 20th century conflicts in which the United States was involved and proved a central element of U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, it has been a tenet of U.S. security policy embedded in legislation and long-standing Department of State and Department of Defense programs. However, the refocusing of U.S. efforts announced in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, moved BPC to the center stage of a new U.S. grand strategy seeking to sustain a favorable world order. Acknowledging U.S. security interests are challenged by “an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied,” the strategic guidance makes clear in its analysis that the United States is not stepping back from its global responsibilities. The U.S. will approach them differently, driven by economic and budgetary realities, and a recognition that effective global security can only occur if we act in

concert with strategic partners and move from an era of persistent conflict to one of persistent security.³ This change acknowledges a shift to a 21st century paradigm.

Ultimately, the grand strategy is about a favorable world order for U.S. interests and the right security partners to help sustain it. Consequently, to properly implement BPC across the spectrum of conflict, strategists and planners in SOF, and elsewhere within the military structure, must appreciate the framework of the 21st century U.S. grand strategy and the parameters of effective partnering and strategic partnerships. Once these are grasped, BPC is revealed as a grand strategic concept leading to the objectives of more effective state governance and a favorable international order. Both BPC's design and implementation require understanding of the strategic environment. Only with such understanding can the right international partners be identified and supported, and productive strategic partnerships built and sustained. Fortunately, both the research and experience of the last two decades reveals much about the relationship among security, stability, good governance, and capacity building. Within the military, doctrine at the joint, service, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) levels has experienced a renaissance of thinking, bringing back much previously learned and incorporating new thinking generated by changing global conditions and recent experience with 21st century issues. Much of this thinking is counterinsurgency (COIN) oriented, but it has moved beyond this to a larger perspective. From the research, experience, and doctrinal insights, lessons can be drawn about the best use of U.S. military forces, particularly limited SOF resources, in BPC.

Successful BPC is a complex and difficult undertaking. Such complexity and difficulty require a high degree of strategic thinking at senior levels and a developed sense of strategic appreciation at lower levels to ensure BPC achieves and retains strategic focus and does not become a menu of activities to be spread fairly across the various areas of operation around the globe. Only then can tactical activities be synchronized in support of strategic objectives and the whole of the efforts support the grand strategy. Historical experience suggests we must understand ourselves and others, and how we want to shape the world in order to achieve stability and security. The purpose of this monograph is to provide such strategic context and develop a broader understanding of BPC as a strategic concept in order to improve practice at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Chapters 1, 2, and

3 offer a summary perspective of the 21st century security challenge confronting the United States and its partners and the U.S. role in confronting it. Chapter 4 examines the concepts of strategic understanding, partnering, and strategic partnerships using British models, which this author finds a useful supplement to U.S. doctrine. Chapter 5 explores the relationship between capacity and resiliency, discusses a broader perspective of capacity building, and examines the changing nature and interdependency of the security sector. It concludes by offering a number of posits about BPC that provide strategic perspective. Chapter 6 seeks to provide a simplified overview of the complex and confusing mechanisms, procedures, laws, and doctrine that govern U.S. military BPC in order to facilitate more effective strategy formulation and planning and avoid pitfalls. It also offers overviews of service and organizational cultural perspectives as expressed in key documents. Chapter 7 presents what the author concludes are useful perspectives for Special Operations Strategy and Planning. In attempting to explore and understand 21st century BPC as a grand strategic concept as opposed to a continuing series of programs or activities, this monograph is necessarily broad in its approach and not fully developed in many areas. The strategic nature of BPC requires much more research and thought; however, the research and doctrine highlighted herein demonstrate the value of thinking more strategically about how BPC is pursued, and offer insights on how to do this.

1. The United States and the Struggle for Order

The strategic environment in which the United States finds itself today is the result of large historical forces or trends set in motion in the past that continue to shape the world even as newer and more sweeping technological and social changes are being introduced. While the future environment cannot be predicted with certainty, it will be shaped and influenced by the choices the actors make, just as it has been in the past. Thus, whatever the strategic environment of the 21st century ultimately reveals itself to be, it will be a combination of continuities from the past and changes introduced by people and events, or that occur by chance. The world order as it exists today is largely a result of the forces of Western modernity interacting within itself and with the natural environment and other cultures. In this interaction, the U.S. national narrative has played a key role in shaping the order as it is and in creating the potential for even greater progress for mankind. Thus, the U.S. narrative is an integral part of the order and stability and instability within it. This narrative is also the larger path the United States must follow in the pursuit of its interests.

Modernity is a term used to describe the longer period of ongoing change leading to today. Various disciplines use the term differently—it is often considered value laden by suggesting some cultures are less esteemed—but it nonetheless conjures up a useful strategic conception for understanding interaction within today's world order. In a very broad sense, modernity can be applied to the epoch in history from the Age of Enlightenment to current times. Some prefer to talk of a postmodern period to distinguish between earlier periods of advancement and change and the dramatic increase in the pace of change that began in the latter part of the 20th century. While the broader interpretation is advocated herein, the exponentially increasing pace of change is an important characteristic to keep in mind.

In politics, modernity might be traced through the political dissertations of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, the American and French revolutions, the rise of liberalism as a political system, response to Wilsonianism, the creation of the United Nations, the triumph of democracy at the end of the Cold War, and the emerging of the current global order. In economics, it can

be traced through the rise of industrialization; free trade; increasing individual and national specialization; increasing movement of goods, capital, and people; greater interdependency; and the so-called information age. Each of these changes as they unfolded were opposed by other ideas—Locke by absolutism, the American and French revolutions by monarchism, free trade by mercantilism, liberalism by totalitarianism, Wilsonianism by colonialism, and liberal capitalism by communism. In hindsight, modernity is inherently a dynamic process, an interaction between what was and all of what could be. It is a struggle about the nature of mankind's future, having its historical foundation rising in the enlightenment and yielding today's so-called secular globalization. Modernization confronts traditionalism in all its forms—political, economic, social, religious, and ideological—and consequently affects various societies and cultures in different ways. It offers both opportunities and threats—varying degrees of progress and pain for societies and individuals as they undergo and struggle with change. Portraying modernity as simply the rise of modern society or industrial civilization belies the complexity of the tensions and interactions that are still ongoing.

Modernity is associated with: “(1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world—the idea of the world as open to transformation by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy; [and] (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy.”⁴ It differs from life and change in traditional societies because it is vastly more dynamic and looks to the future as opposed to the past—encouraging and seeking change and “progress.”⁵ As a result, for many in traditional societies, it represents “the loss of certainty and the realization that certainty can never be established once and for all.”⁶ It is “a progressive force promising to liberate humankind from ignorance and irrationality,”⁷ whether they see a need to be liberated or not. Hence, the advent of modernity challenges what traditional societies believe about themselves and the world they live in—and yet, in a globalized world, they and their leaders cannot escape modernity's promises or consequences. Modernity occurs in all societies today, but often at differing paces.

Founded in the formative period of modernity, the United States crafted a grand national narrative of modernity eloquently expressed in the Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,—That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.⁸

These words and the ideas behind them were clarified and codified in the Constitution and Bill of Rights to better explain the relationship among state and federal governments, and among the branches of government as well as government's power and relationship with individuals. Yet the basic narrative remains the same—one of individual, economic, and ideological freedom, even as its outward features morph to encompass change. It is a remarkable living narrative that accounts for our past and carries us into an uncertain future.

Sometimes referred to as American exceptionalism, this narrative explains the American people to themselves and the world in terms of what they are, what they believe, and how they will interface with the rest of the peoples of the world. In this narrative, the nation is founded not on ethnic origins or class subordination, but on a common set of beliefs and values as invoked by the founding documents: individual and economic freedom, inalienable natural and human rights, democracy, republicanism, rule of law, civil liberty, civic virtue, free trade, common good, fair play, private property, constitutional government, happiness, hard work, progress, education, security, the American dream, and numerous others—a shared journey and destiny toward a better life and more hopeful future. It is true that these beliefs and values often contradict one another in our daily and political lives, but they do guide us in our decisions over time and at least serve as a model for our aspirations. Like modernity, American exceptionalism as a term is seen as somewhat pejorative, in that it suggests Americans see themselves as unique and special with a mission to “convert” the rest of the world. Such a description is contentious; nonetheless, the United States has embraced a pace of political, social, economic, and personal change much

greater than that of most other cultures, and the political, social, and economic tenets of modernity have been promoted by the United States and its allies in laying the foundation for the current international order.

For example, President Woodrow Wilson's 14-point speech resonated with people around the globe and set standards that were interpreted and ultimately inculcated in societies around the world. While change was neither immediate nor painless, the days of traditional colonialism were numbered, empires were discredited, and individual freedom and representative governance were advanced. "Wilsonianism" still influences peoples and the international order with its advocacy of: open diplomacy, free trade, anti-imperialism and self-determination, democracy, capitalism, collective security, and arms reductions. It describes a way to a peaceful and stable world order—a set of ideas adopted by others—and is the basis of the current globalism. President Wilson expressed such an order as: "We do not wish to fight her [Germany] either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing."⁹

In a similar manner, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's four freedoms, delivered in a speech to Congress in 1941, carried these U.S. beliefs and values forward:

[W]e look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.¹⁰

Encapsulated in Roosevelt's speech is the essence of America's distinction from past great powers, an articulation of the U.S. worldview based on the values in the founding documents, and a promise of a better future to which the world's peoples can aspire. What makes the United States different from traditional great powers is that these U.S. interests have a universality of appeal that few other states' interests have had in history. In his articulation of the U.S. search for security, expressed here in his four freedoms, President Roosevelt laid out the foundation for a progressive 21st century world order—"the cooperation of free countries, working together, in a friendly civilized society."¹¹ All these values result in enduring U.S. interests of ideological freedom, economic prosperity, and physical security. All are rooted in individual freedom—the supremacy of human rights everywhere.¹²

The U.S. role in regard to modernity affects our success in BPC in other states—we occupy a unique position in regard to the history of modernity and the struggle between change and tradition—posing contradictory promises of a better future and a threat to the "valued" aspects of the past. For the peoples of the world, America's policy and actions both inspire and disappoint. This dichotomy explains, for example, why many Islamic peoples embrace the idealism of many of our values and reject the realities of much of our policy.¹³ To be successful in pursuing our national interests, we must first recognize that we are to a great extent the agent of modernity and what that implies, and then act in accordance with the implications of that realization.

The U.S. role as an exemplar of modernity and a leader of efforts to construct an integrated world order led al-Qaeda to our doorstep and makes us increasingly dependent on global stability. Both the ongoing debate and the current circumstances we find ourselves in as a nation are largely the product of our own values and aspirations as we lead the way into the modern world. While we did not solely create this world as it is, our ideas and actions certainly shaped it. And while we cannot control the world to come with certainty, our decisions and actions, or lack thereof, will surely shape it also. We need to stay focused on what is important to us and pursue our national narrative because it is both "right" and in our long term security interests.

The events of 9/11 remind us that we cannot control all that occurs within the strategic environment, but it did not invalidate the aspirations or fundamental outlook of the American people. It also failed to convince the peoples of the world that they should not aspire to a better life as the evolving Arab Spring illustrates. Here, as elsewhere, where change will lead is open to

debate. Nonetheless, while all have questioned and rejected some aspects of U.S. policy and popular culture, most continue to aspire to the majority of our fundamental beliefs and aspirations. They recognize that the American narrative encourages and rewards active participation in improving individual and collective circumstances. Intuitively, many states' populations grasp that the traditional thinking of most political and economic elites assumes that power and wealth are finite, and finds the modern empowerment of people threatening. The American experience suggests that economies and freedom can expand indefinitely, and with this growth increasing opportunities are created for all. For all our alleged ugliness, Americans do not so much believe that they are entitled to more than others; rather, they are more inclined to believe that if competition is allowed to flourish on a reasonable playing field, they will come out ahead. For Americans and their allies, the narrative is not so much about winners and losers as about continuation of a "fair" game in which to prosper.

Other societies and peoples have their own contradictions in values as they pursue their visions of a better life in a rapidly changing world. Trapped with one foot in the manifestations of their values in the past and another foot trying to step over the harsh realities of poverty and conflict, they too seek progress. A liberal-capitalist model as promulgated by the United States and its partners offers their best opportunity and it is the transformation to a 21st century state that is the major hurdle. President Barack Obama said in 2009:

For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination. Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation's resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours. What we have fought for—what we continue to fight for—is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.¹⁴

The U.S. national narrative is a continuation of ideas at the heart of Western modernism and these ideas have universal appeal to the peoples of the world. Globalization is largely founded on this expanded U.S. narrative and our national success: a stable and favorable 21st century world order is integrally bound up with globalization. For most of our history, U.S.

citizens have lived this narrative in a still-forming nation of mostly open and expanding economic opportunity. Life, liberty, happiness, and safety conjure up more collective values—free markets, equal opportunity, free elections, liberal democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law, and individualism—that define us as a people and a state. In combination with the complementary narratives of our international partners, it has created the emerging international order. In spite of the universal appeal of our idealism, it often clashes with the hierarchy, community, tradition, and custom found in the older cultures of more stratified societies. Peoples and opportunists interrupt and misinterpret our narrative in terms that are meaningful to them. However, its universality is encoded in the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁵ People who focus on states signing the Declaration and then failing to live up to it miss the point. States sign the Declaration because of its universality of appeal to populations and the legitimacy it confers.

“Despite its imperfections, democracy remains a beacon of hope for all of us.”

While successful states have narratives that unite their people in moving to the future, troubled states often lack a unifying narrative, either because the leadership is inept or challengers offer a more compelling narrative. Yet, aspects of the American narrative emerge time and time again in the struggles and aspirations of others. As Aung San Suu Kyi of a troubled Burma reminded us when receiving the Congressional Gold Medal: “Despite its imperfections, democracy remains a beacon of hope for all of us.”¹⁶ Regardless of the level of development, all modern states’ narratives must unite their people in ways that allow them to participate successfully in the 21st century world order. And each narrative, like religion, must be reinterpreted for successive generations to some degree to explain the world as it evolves around us. Understanding and promoting the universal appeal of the U.S. narrative and remaining consistent with that narrative while understanding and appreciating the nuances of others’ narratives is the key to successfully building partnership capacity and moving forward.

2. A Favorable World Order in the Balance

Much has already been written on the still-emerging strategic environment of the 21st century. “Globalization” is the buzzword with the most traction to describe the overall “dynamic process of rapidly growing, if uneven, cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, technology, ideas, cultures, values, crimes, and weapons throughout the world.”¹⁷ Globalization is a megatrend “altering the world economic, cultural, and security landscape...volatility will increase as shifts in traditional power structures occur.”¹⁸ The exponential increase of this change is most clearly evident in the economic sector. Capital transfer has risen from a daily transfer rate among international markets of \$20 billion in 1983 to \$1.6 trillion in 2008.¹⁹ Globalization affects everything in the social order and poses significant potential security challenges. Today’s globalization is in many ways the immediate product of the efforts of the United States and its allies to create a liberal-capitalist global counterbalance to communist expansionism, but it is also the product of longer historical trends of modernity. In the interplay of continuities and change within the strategic environment, globalization’s interconnectedness holds forth great promise for mankind but also portends a number of challenges for individuals and states. U.S. strategists and planners need an understanding of the characteristics and interactions of this hyperactive strategic environment and its security challenges, for the favorable world order hangs in a delicate balance.

Globalization’s Two Faces

What constitutes globalization is subject to interpretation, but national security professionals need to understand globalization in its broadest or most holistic context. In a broad strategic sense, globalization is a confluence of trends and events that has resulted in a greater convergence of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) in the domestic and international environments in which peoples and states exist.²⁰ Individual and collective interpretations and responses to these changes in light of coexisting historical continuities and their previous experience create a period of

hyperinteraction and greater VUCA—an environment of greater change and reaction, and corresponding instability at individual and collective levels. For example, at the international collective level, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union raised the question of what international order would replace the superpower bipolar structure. Unipolar, multipolar, global collectivism, and a potential new superpower competition in various forms were all put forward as candidate systems by the world's politicians and pundits, and they affected how states interacted. Not surprisingly, in hindsight, al-Qaeda and other radical non-state actors seized the opportunities to propose and pursue their own models of government and international order. At the same time, most states, including many former U.S. allies, rejected the George H.W. Bush administration's conceptualization of a world order formed around a sole superpower.²¹ Until this question of order has been successfully resolved, greater instability threats than in the Cold War will flourish, enabled and empowered to varying degrees by the forces of globalization. The issues are not new, nor the security threats unprecedented; however, the problems and actions of too many others are no longer remote and are able to significantly affect the United States and its interests.

Technological advances and diffusion, the rise of global trade and supporting international and state economic institutions and processes, the rise of information and knowledge as the primary engine of social and economic activity as opposed to agriculture or production of manufactured goods, and the emergence of a global information network and civil society are among the key enabling trends that brought on this period of globalization and sustain it.²² “Interconnectedness” is the term used to describe how globalization has changed the nature of interaction among the world's peoples, states, economies, cultures, ecosystems, ideas, and ideologies. Globalization is a dynamic process that directly affects the way civilization's multiple systems interact and the everyday lives of individuals and populations. It creates more and different patterns of social, political, economic, and security interdependence, cooperation, competition, and conflict.

The enabling trends of globalization have been accompanied by or created other natural and social trends whose existence and interaction add additional VUCA to the international and domestic environments: environmental and other man-made disasters; population growth, migration, and urbanization; resource competition; fragile and failed states; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; empowerment of non-state actors; and more.

The cascading changes induced by globalization's trends and interaction sometimes complement and often conflict with important continuities of the past. Globalization has increased productivity and improved flows of information and knowledge. It has made material goods more available and affordable to the world's peoples than ever before. The world is flattening off in terms of economic well-being and longevity when measured by states. The differences in the characteristics of wealth between nations are much less than 50 years ago. While stark differences still exist between the rich and the poor, it is less between nations and more among the populations of the individual states.²³ Yet in the process, globalization has changed the past social and economic order as experienced by individuals and states, often turning social and economic expectations and historical experience upside down.

Globalization's interconnectedness is inherently destabilizing. For example, industrialization in the United States has been superseded by a service economy as global competition in industrial production has grown, creating both good and bad effects. The bulk of the automobile industry has moved to nations where quality and price can best be balanced with global demand. Affected U.S. autoworkers must reeducate for higher level service jobs, improve production quotas and quality, or risk less pay in the auto industry or other employment. This change has cascaded through the local economy in Detroit, affecting the tax base and city services. While Silicon Valley has flourished, hundreds of thousands of auto-related workers have found change forced on them. This economic turmoil stands to be replicated over and over around the world, sometimes favoring a particular group and other times disadvantaging them. Yet, people in the United States and around the world have benefited from higher quality and lower priced cars and more advanced technology. In a similar manner, globalization has also created new realities, such as in the case of food production where choice now affects demand as much as quantity did in the past. "Two major factors drive food requirements [and market prices]: a growing global population and prosperity that expands dietary preferences."²⁴ How to gain or lose in this marketplace is determined by imagination and innovation as well as others' successes and failures.

The global marketplace has become more open and more competitive, raising prosperity for more people in the past three decades than ever recorded before in history.²⁵ This prosperity is founded on an international economic system of "positive competition" promoted by the United States

and its allies to win the Cold War and subsequently extended to all nations. While not unique to the United States, the pillars of this system resonate with fundamental American values—free trade, free development of individuals and human capital; democracy and rule of law, and peaceful resolution of issues among nations. Uncertainties of the global marketplace affect the daily lives of people, the social order, power relationships, and the nature of governance within all states, and not always in predictable ways. Nations that have transitioned to this modern model of statehood are more likely to possess the human capacity and resiliency to sustain them and compete effectively in the new globalized order. However, nations that are not yet modernized are more susceptible to the negative consequences of global market forces.²⁶

In a similar manner, information has been globalized. The flow of information is nearly instantaneous and knowledge on any subject can be accessed increasingly on the Internet from almost anywhere in the world. The change has empowered the marketplace, enabling it to function better even as it introduces higher degrees of uncertainty, complexity and volatility. On another level, the free flow of information is making peoples more aware of their social condition and that of others. Better educated and informed populations are challenging traditional assumptions associated with social and cultural constructs such as class, power, and religion. At the same time, other populations are made aware of the inhumane or tragic conditions suffered by some and place demands for remedy on their own governments and the greater international community. Still others find opportunity in this information flow to exploit weak governance or social injustice to serve their own ideological and political ambitions.

Globalization has created new opportunities and new issues. It has created an era of unprecedented prosperity and the potential to extend this further, founded on the free flow of capital and information that is exponentially, if unevenly, expanding wealth among those states and populations that can participate.²⁷ It has also challenged the power elites, destroyed non-competitive economies, overwhelmed existing governments and ideas about government, created new political opportunism for better or worse ends, indiscriminately threatened or destroyed traditional societies, and made populations aware of the disparities of wealth and opportunity. It has both raised and disappointed the expectations of the populations of the world and often done both at the same time within and among populations. If it has created its advocates, it has also created its opponents. For many it has

challenged what they are and what they would become—for all, it challenges how people have traditionally thought about the world and how to create a stable domestic and world order. Given human nature, it should not surprise anyone that American autoworkers still want to be paid as if only the United States can make cars, or that mullahs in Pakistan long for a time when they alone held power in the village because it had been ordained by God and no one was there to challenge their authority, or that opportunists seek gain. Man's environment has been radically modified by globalization, but human nature has not changed. Unfortunately, man's social constructs have not yet adjusted to the new realities posed by globalization or fully embraced an era of positive competition. Until they do, globalization's two faces—the potential to raise global prosperity and well-being or to destabilize states—leave a favorable world order for the United States in a precarious balance.

A Spectrum of States

The elements of a successful state in an era of positive competition reflect the universality of the American narrative, even as they differ somewhat in important nuances. As illustrated in Figure 1, such states exercise modern sovereignty in which a successful state nests inside a secure and stable international order. Modern sovereignty creates an environment that facilitates and provides human security. Human security is achieved when all citizens are safe from chronic threats of hunger, disease, and repression, and are protected from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life at home, at the workplace, or within the community.²⁸ It implies a safe and secure environment and a degree of social well-being in which human capital can flourish. Successful states also provide effective governance under the rule of law. Rule of law ensures equality and justice in government systems and permits citizens to participate in the political system, and facilitates the economic and infrastructure development that encourage and sustain economic growth. Within successful states, issues in social relationships are resolved through political settlement as opposed to social conflict. In a similar manner, successful states seek political agreement among states to settle issues in state relationships. Logically, successful states seek to support similar characteristics of success in assisted states as the progress and stability of the international order is dependent on the shared values and success of individual members. In a positively competing environment, success is




Figure 1. Elements of a Stable State²⁹

relative as opposed to an absolute. Progress is the real measure of state success and state viability in light of continuing changes the goal.

Unfortunately, 21st century states exist along a continuum from viable states to failed states—a spectrum of states (see Figure 2). While this spectrum is not new, the complexity, interconnectivity, and interdependence of globalization—and its accompanying social trends such as undisciplined urban and littoral growth, increased migration, power diffusion, uneven economic development, troubling demographics, etc.—make almost any 21st century state vulnerable to a degree of social, economic, or political instability in the face of major natural disasters or man-made calamities.³⁰ One need look no further than the U.S. experiences with Hurricane Katrina or the recent housing crisis to see how even the strongest states are susceptible to setbacks. Viable states are able to use internal capacity and routine means of international assistance and collaboration to deal with the consequences of natural, economic, and political crises originating at home and abroad. For example, viable states with representative forms of government often deal with governmental shortcomings or other internal economic and political crises by electing more capable governments. For them, existing

international relations means and institutions, such as the World Bank, are sufficient to overcome adversity. The challenges are more problematic for troubled states—the so-called fragile and failed states.³¹




Figure 2. Spectrum of States³²

A fragile state is a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government.³³ These weaknesses arise from several root causes, including ineffective governance, criminalization of the state, economic failure, external aggression, and internal strife due to disenfranchisement of large sections of the population. Fragile states frequently fail to achieve any momentum toward development. They can generate tremendous human suffering, create regional security challenges, and collapse into wide, ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists and criminal organizations. Failed states are less common than fragile states and no longer have a functioning state government. They create the same issues, often greatly magnified, of the fragile state. Fragile and failed states pose an inherent threat to other states and international order in general as their problems are exported globally through migration, terrorism, transnational criminal activities, and civil society's concern for human suffering. The U.S. military and other U.S. agencies may be called upon to conduct activities in any such state with a goal of state recovery and movement from instability to stability, and from security risk to security contributor.

On the other hand, failed states and ungoverned territories, or undergoverned regions, are a part of human history and may continue to exist in some

form.³⁴ Not every ungoverned space requires attention and not every troubled state warrants intervention. The problem is not so much with “ungovernance” as it is with how these territories affect the stability and well-being of the governed regions of the world. Hence, intervention or assistance in another’s territory is a matter of a considered strategic choice—an option to be chosen when strategically appropriate and supported with capabilities suitable to the circumstances and strategic value.

The need for intervention and state-building assistance is an enduring characteristic of a successful U.S. favorable world order. Globalization has increased the ability to interact on a global scale and overall global prosperity, but not evenly. It tends to reward the skilled, the prepared, the agile, and sometimes the lucky, whether individuals or states. Its characteristics and dynamics empower new actors and marginalize others largely without regard to morality—morality is left to states’ common interests, religion, and the individual and collective consciences of man and civil society. States and the collective international community have yet to grasp globalization’s full implications or the mixture of natural and governmental rules that will be necessary to ensure domestic and international stability and security. Until these rules are discerned, codified, and embraced, the level of global instability will continue to be a significant challenge to the interests of the United States and its partners—and to other states that seek to govern effectively for their people. To protect and advance those interests and respond to domestic political pressure, the United States and others will find themselves repeatedly drawn into the affairs of fragile and failed states.

Thus, regardless of the reasons that some suggest will preclude U.S. involvement in “another Afghanistan or Iraq,” the threats to our interests and those of our strategic partners will be politically and morally compelling. Not in every case, but potentially in a sufficient number of circumstances to justify considered strategic thought and preparation in regard to assistance and intervention—the what, when, how, why, and necessary capabilities and resources. Involvement in other state’s affairs will be dictated by security concerns, as was the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda’s export of violence to the United States on 9/11 directly attacked the physical security of U.S. citizens and threatened to disrupt the economic well-being of the United States and its partners. Any U.S. government would have to act in regard to fragile or failed states that provide safe haven to potential threats to core interests or risk being driven from office.

Less understood, but increasingly compelling, is how the U.S. value of human life as a U.S. interest will play out in the information-rich and civil-society empowered environment of today. As natural and man-made disasters—the denial of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—plays across global communication networks, publics at home and abroad will demand some kind of response. Publics may grow weary of support over time, but having recovered they will again hold policymakers accountable for human suffering. Humanitarian aid, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and military intervention are logical outcomes of a concerned citizenry of the developed nations. Founded in fundamental values and emotion and manipulated by press and politicians, publics and politicians will logically turn to the responsiveness of military operations. In part, the nature of globalization is to increasingly make local and state problems transnational problems, and the military will be part of the solution in many cases.

Interventions and assistance of any nature invariably have some component of capacity building and may or may not require military forces. While they can occur with a state anywhere along the spectrum of states and the spectrum of peace and combat (See Figure 3), troubled states will be the most problematic. Most often, military involvement will be cases in which an invitation is proffered, but military intervention may also be resisted by an existing government or other actors within a state.

The Strategic Quandary

In the end, a favorable U.S. future is intertwined with the continued advance of modernity. Modernity promotes a new global culture: “A world culture based on advanced technology and the spirit of science, on a rational view of life, a secular approach to social relations, a feeling of justice in public affairs, and, above all else, on the acceptance in the political realm that the prime unit of the polity should be the nation-state.”³⁵ Globalization with its free flow of goods, people, information, and ideas is the continued manifestation of this culture. Some attributes have had universal appeal while others have proven repugnant among more tradition-minded peoples. Often, reactions are contradictory within the same society or culture. Thus, free speech may be esteemed while how it is used condemned. Free trade is sought while the jobs lost to more competitive states lead to trade restrictions. In this globalized environment, good state governance is paramount. Modern political




Figure 3. Continuum of Military Operations³⁶

development to facilitate progress and prosperity is essential to a competitive and stable society and state. It is a prerequisite to economic participation, facilitates development of human capital, and encourages innovation and risk taking. Administrative and legal development, mass mobilization and participation, building of democracy, stability and orderly change, and equality are fundamental characteristics of successful and enduring globalized states.³⁷ President Obama grasps the essence of the balance of governance, prosperity, and values in the American narrative in explaining our limitations in Afghanistan:

Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy. It taps the potential of our people, and allows investment in new industry. And it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we did in the last. That's why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be

open-ended—because the nation that I’m most interested in building is our own.³⁸

However, a prosperous United States without a favorable and stable world order is not realizable. The United States national narrative is rooted in commercial enterprise and free trade as strongly as it is in human rights and representative government. Strong, viable states competing peacefully and contributing effectively within a global community offer the best hope of such a world order—and one in which all peoples can pursue their individual and collective aspirations. If this vision of the positive aspects of globalization is the preferred future, both states—successful and failing—and peoples must continuously change in order to thrive. In a system of positively competing states, it will be increasingly in the interest of the developed states to ensure that lesser developed or failed states become successful governing entities—states that can meet the needs of their populations without resorting to negative competition or internal suppression.

For many states, developing the capacity for positive competition requires modernization within society and changes in how sovereignty and legitimacy are understood. While no specific model is appropriate for every state and every society, the broad outline is applicable to all and the basic tenets evident. Modern states must achieve and retain a delicate balance in regard to these tenets. Internally, they must achieve domestic legitimacy by governance through rule of law, a vibrant civil society, an acceptable degree of

Stability for states and the international order as a whole is always in delicate balance in regard to this gyroscope of tenets.

social justice, and control of corruption in its many forms. International legitimacy results from successful domestic legitimacy and adherence to and support of international rule of law. “Legitimacy,” on both levels, defines the state’s ability to freely exercise the prerogatives of sovereignty. Force or circumstances can suppress the tenets, but states that cannot and will not accept the fundamental tenets of the outline will fall further and further behind in the progress of the world and potentially create or contribute to stability problems, which the global community may ultimately need to address. Stability for states and the international order as a whole is always in delicate balance in regard to this gyroscope of tenets (See Figure 4). Thus, inherent within the character of human and physical nature, the advance of

modernity, and the environment of positive competition is a degree of vulnerability and risk that the international order and its leading powers must insure each state against in order to sustain a global community. Some level of state-building or rebuilding is implicit in such a guarantee.




Figure 4. Modern State Balance

From a U.S. perspective, the international order works best when states cooperate and compete in a zone of cooperation or legitimate competition based on American conceptualizations of free trade, rule of law, and human rights. Thus, the strategic path toward a favorable 21st century for the United States is clear, as indicated in Figure 5. A favorable world order lies in cooperation and legitimate competition and the continued advance of modernity.

Unfortunately, instability threats appear to be on the rise. Since the end of the Cold War, the nation-states' legitimacy and monopoly on the use of force has been challenged in new ways and at an increasing pace. The technologies and awareness of globalization have "awakened previously nascent




Figure 5. Favorable U.S. International Order

or dormant desires for identity and equity” to challenge the legitimacy of many states at home and abroad.³⁹ Notwithstanding the legitimate grievances of some ethnic groups and other disadvantaged members of some states’ populations, globalization presents unprecedented opportunities and capabilities to political opportunists, ideologues, criminals, and others who seek advantages from insecurity and instability within states and the international order. At the same time, globalization of the economy has been uneven and it has disrupted economies and societies. Consequently, at a point of raising expectations, many states, through miscalculation, incompetence, or circumstances, do not possess the stability and resources necessary to exercise sovereignty and reinforce their legitimacy in ways acceptable to their populations. They neither provide traditional security nor meet the rising expectations of their populations. Corrupt and ineffective governments, political and economic opportunists, insurgencies, criminal organizations, and outside actors all contribute to security issues within a growing number of states and have slowed democratization. Unfortunately, in many ways, the near-term changes associated with expanding globalization have favored the challengers to the states’ monopoly on force and legitimacy. Too many states have been unwilling or unable to make the necessary changes to adapt.⁴⁰ Security sector reform is an integral part of this adaption, and many states may require assistance to achieve it or to develop the capacity to be an effective partner in global security.

Security sector reform must be of universal interest among states participating in, seeking to participate in, or wishing to contribute to and benefit from the positive opportunities of 21st century globalized world order. Security, like other aspects of governance, is more complex in the 21st century. The broader concept of human security ties military security assistance more closely to good governance and civil society. Like everything else in a globalized world, security is interconnected. The necessary stability required in the globalized world order is lessened proportionally by the degree of insecurity experienced by individuals, groups, states, and regions. Global stability is affected by both physical acts and perceptions of threats. Wars or terrorist acts disrupt state activities and impose physical damages and costs on their direct victims, but they also levy a toll on the whole of the state, the region, and the international structure based on the perception of how that insecurity may affect aspects of trade and business investment, others' security, and populations' confidence in state and international governance. A lack of security or instability anywhere on the globe has greater or lesser implications at state, regional, and international levels. Instability and its consequences can result from numerous causes: economic turbulence, such as a rise in the cost of oil; the exportation of violence, such as global terrorism; the clamor of civil society over justice or humanitarian concerns, as in Bosnia; the risk of loss of control of weapons of mass destruction, such as with Pakistan; or posturing of rogue states, such as North Korea and Iran. At the center of any insecurity is the failure of states to be able to exercise appropriate sovereignty and legitimacy.⁴¹ As international participants in a small group discussion moderated by this author at one of USSOCOM's Sovereign Challenge events concluded:

Security is essential to international and internal state stability, economic development, and progressive development. The question in the 21st century is what will be the shared sense of how such security is established and sustained.⁴²

Completing the transformation to the new 21st century globalized order is a delicate balancing act. It requires that policymakers and strategists inside and outside of governments understand the characteristics and dynamics of the ongoing globalization and change—the strategic factors, their interactions, and the strategic actions required to bring the ships of state into secure and prosperous harbors. Policymakers in developed, less developed, fragile,

emerging, and failed states must carefully craft a path into this future for their own states and for a still changing international order. Policymakers in the United States must assist judiciously those who need help, and the military, like other U.S. agencies, must provide appropriate policy advice on what, where, when, and how to U.S. political leaders and successfully implement their decisions.

3. Framing the Strategic Game Afoot

In simple terms, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the United States and its coalition of successful states face the same strategic question that confronted the Western power bloc with the fall of the Berlin Wall—what should the new world order be? Unlike then, policymakers and strategists now realize the United States cannot assume that the international environment will be favorable. In hindsight, the U.S. strategic pause following the Cold War appears as a colossal blunder and the so-called peace dividend a distracting illusion. Over 20 years of harsh experience reveals that other state and non-state actors possess their own ideas about a favorable world order and are acting to shape it according to their vision. “Globalization” as the United States envisions it is not a done deal—alternate world-views founded in religious extremism, alternate economic models, and great power competition are all possible. More chaos and instability are likely until the question is resolved.⁴³ Without strategic thought to shape a globalized world order to its favorable potential, U.S. security and the security of other like-minded nations are at risk. The United States must recognize the world as it is and shape it to be favorable to ourselves and those aligned with us. Fortunately, the universality of the U.S. narrative encourages others to join in seeking an era of positive competition.

Legitimate competition in an open and interconnected world order requires that a state compete successfully in all the other realms of governance as well as continue to ensure physical security. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, which is in part a response to the fiscal demands of other aspects of good governance within the United States, recognizes this 21st century reality.⁴⁴ In the preface to a recent Woodrow Wilson International Center paper, “A National Strategic Narrative” by Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby, Anne-Marie Slaughter summarizes the authors’ conclusions in regard to the strategic conundrum posed by the competing demands of good 21st century governance confronting the United States:

Porter and Mykleby give us a non-partisan blueprint for understanding and reacting to the changes of the 21st century world. In one sentence, the strategic narrative of the United States in the 21st century is that we want to become the strongest competitor and

most influential player in a deeply inter-connected global system, which requires that we invest less in defense and more in sustainable prosperity and the tools of effective global engagement.⁴⁵

Hence, U.S. success lies in continuing to live out its universal principles in a world that is changing and reacting in various ways to what the United States has already created or contributed to through pursuit of our narrative and security. As a framework for understanding this changed environment, five useful major transitions in the global system and U.S. strategy are identified in this insightful paper.

First, the international system is changing from a closed, reasonably predictive system in which U.S. policymakers and strategy could largely control or dictate events to an open international system in which the unpredictability of events and actors can easily disrupt international stability. In such an environment, the authors of “A National Strategic Narrative” argue that “control is impossible; the best we can do is to build credible influence—the ability to shape and guide global trends in the direction that serves our values and interests (prosperity and security) within an interdependent strategic ecosystem.”⁴⁶

Second, in the new open system, U.S. grand strategy must move from containment to sustainment. As opposed to thinking in terms of containing our adversaries, the United States must sustain and build its inherent strengths in ways that underpin credible influence.

We can and must still engage internationally, of course, but only after a careful weighing of costs and benefits and with as many partners as possible. Credible influence also requires that we model the behavior we recommend for others, and that we pay close attention to the gap between our words and our deeds.⁴⁷

Third, the focus, or centerpiece, of a grand strategy must move from deterrence and defense to full civilian engagement and better economic competition. Civilian engagement and competition broaden the security complex and lessen defense costs while increasing GNP. In an open system, all domestic and foreign policy assets play a role in credibility and security. Defeatism and protectionism are counterproductive and open competition is what will make the United States stronger and better.⁴⁸

Fourth, any U.S. strategy must avoid zero sum outlooks and embrace positive sum global politics/economics.

An interdependent world creates many converging interests and opportunities for positive-sum rather than zero-sum competition. The threats that come from interdependence (economic instability, global pandemics, global terrorist and criminal networks) also create common interests in countering those threats domestically and internationally.⁴⁹

Thus, positive sum outlooks are inherent to an era of positive competition and a favorable world order for the United States depends on building strategic partnerships that serve all.

Fifth, grand strategy must change its focus from “national security” to “national prosperity and security” to emphasize how important the nation’s prosperity is to ensuring the broader security required in the new 21st century environment. “‘National prosperity and security’ reminds us where our true security begins.”⁵⁰

Equally important, the paper’s preface correctly summarizes the national struggle that has characterized the U.S. population’s ambiguity with state-building in recent years. In doing so, it focuses on the “centrality of influence” in today’s world.⁵¹ And, it brilliantly summarizes the United States’ role and place in an era of positive competition.

America’s national story has always see-sawed between exceptionalism and universalism. We think that we are an exceptional nation, but a core part of that exceptionalism is a commitment to universal values—to the equality of all human beings not just within the borders of the United States, but around the world. We should thus embrace the rise of other nations when that rise is powered by expanded prosperity, opportunity, and dignity for their peoples. In such a world we do not need to see ourselves as the automatic leader of any bloc of nations. We should be prepared instead to earn our influence through our ability to compete with other nations, the evident prosperity and wellbeing of our people, and our ability to engage not just with states but with societies in all their richness and complexity. We do not want to be the sole superpower that billions of people around the world have learned to hate from fear of our

military might. We seek instead to be the nation other nations listen to, rely on and emulate out of respect and admiration.⁵²

Clearly, the United States and its partners cannot take responsibility for the success of every state, but neither can they escape the necessity of fostering a favorable and supportive global order. To do otherwise would be to court their demise. Hence, the whole of the United States government is interested in fostering compatible successful states, and in a more comprehensive context, so are U.S. international partners. Every state is responsible for the internal aspects of nation building; however, the United States needs to be in the state-building assistance business in support of nations that are trying to transform themselves into successful 21st century states. A favorable world order and state-building are intertwined, and state-building provides the strategic framework for creating and sustaining a favorable order. The real question is not whether the United States should engage in state-building, but how the United States can go about assisting states in

Every state is responsible for the internal aspects of nation building ...

building themselves without politically and economically bankrupting ourselves in the process. Further, in the 21st century, state-building works best when national actors and international actors have parallel goals and undertake complementary activities that serve the interests of both governments and all the peoples involved. The military, like other members of the U.S. government, must think more broadly and strategically about what successful states are in the 21st century and the purpose and nature of U.S. BPC efforts in building an era of positive competition.

The reality is assisting other states requires effective policy and strategy as well as hard work, good intentions, and a little luck. It requires knowing the distinction between nation-building and state-building and when and how to assist. Plainly, states must build their own nation—construct a national identity, narrative, and vision that unite their subcultures into a collective society. It can only be done internally. They must also build a viable state—a state effectively governed where a competitive economy and human security thrive under the rule of law. Capacity-building assistance can play a key role in state-building; nonetheless, the state must take ownership of both. Continuing issues in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the consequences of failing in the former in spite of significant outside assistance in state-building.

Ultimately, the United States will determine its interests based on its overarching values and achieve a political consensus on a strategy consistent with them. It will pursue these interests in form and substance in ways that are favorable to self and provide mutual benefits for others. Making these benefits obvious will preclude other actors from profiting by working at cross purposes to U.S. policy and strategy and is an inherent part of the formulation of policy and strategy. What should be obvious is that the United States does not need to tolerate ambiguity about why we assist in state-building. We are involved in state-building because it is in our national interests to do so in order to ensure a favorable world order in which we can live according to our values. “When and how” to pursue state-building are the most troubling strategic questions for the United States and its allies in the 21st century.

The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms...We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest—because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.⁵³

The world has changed and is still changing. If the United States wants to shape a favorable world order—a world of positive competition, any grand strategy must focus on both national prosperity and security, and must consider the well-being of other states. State-building assistance is an integral part of such a strategy. However, security cannot come at the cost of U.S. prosperity and therefore partnering with other states is essential to a successful U.S. strategy. The success of the U.S. grand strategy depends on a base of like-minded strategic partners. While in the 21st century all states have global interests and responsibilities as a result of globalization, not all will be like-minded in regard to values and aims. Consequently, much of the strategic game afoot is partnering and building strategic partnerships. Given the likely spectrum of state-building assistance and security’s interconnectiveness with other aspects of governance and civil society, the U.S. military will be a central component of any assistance and capacity building. It behooves the policymakers and military professionals to think more strategically about partnerships and capacity building.

4. Understanding, Partnering, and Strategic Partnerships

Today's threats have become so complex, fast moving, and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever hope to solve them alone.⁵⁴ – Retired Admiral William H. McRaven, former commander of USSOCOM

The United States cannot achieve global stability and assure its security, nor follow its national narrative, in the world of the 21st century alone. U.S. success is dependent on a system of like-minded states and effective strategic partners who function successfully in and sustain an environment of positive competition, and share the costs of security and dealing with instability. This interdependency makes BPC an essential concept of any U.S. strategy. BPC is the concept that builds and sustains the system of successful and cooperative states. BPC is fundamentally a partnering strategy, which must be founded in understanding of the strategic and operational environments and the actors and interaction within and among them. Effective partnering avoids wasting efforts and resources on enterprises that are not productive. Successful BPC is founded first in achieving strategic understanding of the environment and actors and, second, in applying the understanding to the selection and development of partners and the means of capacity building. Consequently, the best long-term outcome of a successful BPC strategy—sustained strategic partnerships—is ultimately dependent on success in the human domain.⁵⁵ This chapter proffers some ideas about strategic understanding, partnering, and strategic partnership from British doctrine in order to better inform purpose and practice in BPC.⁵⁶

British doctrine views the human domain as:

the interaction between human actors, their activity and their broader environment ... This broad environment is shaped by 4 principal factors: the culture that affects how they interpret and orient themselves towards that environment; the institutions which embody cultural ideas as practices; the technology and infrastructure that people assemble to survive in their environment; and the physical environment in which people live.⁵⁷

The complexity of the interaction of actors and environments—the human domain—is illustrated in Figure 6. Interactions occur within the individual environments and actor groups and among the various environments and human activities and actors. Such interactions define the present and shape the future. They represent opportunities and challenges for national strategy and frame the potential for and nature of BPC concepts. Taken together, they represent the human domain—the arena in which policymakers and strategists seek to exert influence and take actions to gain more favorable outcomes. All decisions and actions must be considered in light of the VUCA of the human domain—the totality of a non-static strategic environment.




Figure 6. Interaction Among Actors and Environments⁵⁸

Understanding

Statecraft is the advancement and protection of national values and interests in the international environment. Current British doctrine identifies the three components of statecraft as understanding, power, and influence. The crux of their doctrinal argument is that without understanding, decisions about the use of power and influence—the means of statecraft—are too often unseeing, visionless and capricious. Understanding allows the development and sustainment of a proper national viewpoint—an overall global strategic perspective, and what to do in the context of any particular environment.

Understanding is:

...the acquisition and development of knowledge to enable insight (knowing why something has happened or is happening) and foresight (being able to identify and anticipate what may happen). Analysis of this situational awareness provides greater comprehension (insight) of the problem. Judgments based on this comprehension provide understanding of the problem (foresight). This is summarized as:

Understanding

Situational awareness + analysis = Comprehension (Insight)

Comprehension + judgment = Understanding (Foresight)

The distinction between situational awareness and understanding is the level of analysis and depth of comprehension that allows judgment to be applied effectively.⁵⁹

The idea of and need for “understanding” is common in civilian and military literature dealing with today’s complex strategic environment. Understanding has its strategic, operational, and tactical aspects. Effective BPC requires “a deeper penetration of the human domain in which adversaries and other actors will compete with and confront [and complement] each other.”⁶⁰ Success in BPC depends on understanding of the human domain and how best to interact within it to serve national interests.⁶¹ It also requires greater understanding of the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical environments and the interactions within and among these levels. The operational and tactical environments must always be seen in the context of the national, regional, and global perspectives in play. Strategic understanding and appreciation set the context for approaching the operational and tactical environments, and actions at the lower levels in turn shape the strategic environment.

At the higher levels, strategists, planners, and decision-makers must make use of intelligence and knowledge from multiple sources within and outside government in pursuing, developing, and implementing BPC. External sources may include: anthropologists and sociologists; geographers, academics or other government departments; industry experts; economics or financial experts; historians; and others. Such experts provide additional information and context, which are the building blocks of understanding.⁶²

Understanding enables strategists, planners, and decision-makers to best know when to interact as well as what to do and how to do it. However, understanding is always contextual, perishable, imperfect, and competitive by nature. Risk in decision-making is relative to the quality of understanding, but always exists.⁶³

Partnering and Strategic Partnerships

Partnering and strategic partnerships among nations are not new ideas. In the pursuit of national interests, states have historically aligned themselves formally and informally in alliances and concerts of action to deter, defeat, or mitigate the actions of adversaries and potential adversaries in the security, economic, and political realms. In the 21st century, the strategic logic of partnerships makes even greater sense. Partnering, like BPC, can occur anywhere along the spectrum of conflict or across the spectrum of states when it is in the interests of the states involved. While partnering and partnership are not new concepts, they deserve reexamination in light of the complexity of the 21st century strategic environment and the U.S. need for others to participate in sustaining a stable and secure international order. Partners can help deter potential threats, promote a mutually favorable world order, and take on a share of security responsibilities, such as presence, stability activities, and warfighting.

The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan created a new doctrinal interest in partnerships. While most U.S. doctrine is silent on a definition of a partner or partnership, a recent U.S. Army publication defined partnership as: “The relationship between two or more people, groups, institutions, or nations that are involved in the same action or endeavor.”⁶⁴ While true, such a definition is so general that it is of little use in understanding the purpose, nature, and roles of “partnering” in a BPC strategy. Other U.S. Army doctrine tends to categorize partners, potential partners, and others in the international environment that may have relationships in relation to U.S. interests. In this portrayal, a state or non-state actor may fall into one or more categories depending on context, including critical region partners, key supporting partners, or actors of concern.

Critical regional partners are countries or organizations that:

- Are direct recipients of U.S. security cooperation resources.
- Cannot achieve one or more end states without engagement.

- Reflect a deliberately select group of countries or organizations.
- May be in current relationships or desired for future relationships.
- Are able to pursue partnerships during the life of current guidance (two years).

Key supporting partners are countries or organizations that:

- Assist a command in achieving one or more end states.
- May or may not be from the region under consideration.
- Provide capabilities that complement or supplement United States capabilities.

Actors of concern are countries or organizations that:

- May or may not be potential adversaries.
- Affect security cooperation and shaping (phase 0) activities designed to solve problems or
- Influence behavior, counter negative influences, or set the conditions for operational success.
- Pose a direct and immediate problem to a region.⁶⁵

Such definition and categorization has its utility, but does not provide the necessary theoretical basis for choosing, pursuing, and consummating strategic partnerships, nor the insights necessary for successful strategy and planning. Even SOF's focus on relationships and trust, as key as it is, is insufficient.

Recent British doctrine is more theoretical and comprehensive, offering a richer perspective for the demands of the 21st century. It makes a useful distinction between partnering and a strategic partnership, highlighting that it is possible to "work cooperatively and collaboratively without pursuing a strategic partnership."⁶⁶ However, from the British perspective, any true political strategic partnership is in effect "a formal relationship based on a sound legal arrangement, trust, and mutual respect where the partners are otherwise independent bodies who agree to cooperate and share risks to achieve common goals that are mutually beneficial."⁶⁷ Thus,

a partner is generally somebody that we already trust and have an established habitual strategic relationship with, whether that is more informal (friends) or formal (allies). Partnering is an approach to relationship-building founded on a common framework of co-operation and assistance to develop shared interests and trust over

time that potentially results in a full partnership. Partnering is therefore not an end in itself, but a means to achieving this joint undertaking.⁶⁸

In the British outlook, partnership is a process that occurs in several phases or stages (See Figure 7). While written with interventions in mind, the British insights to partnering have application to BPC across the spectrums of states and peace and conflict.




Figure 7. The British Stages of Partnership Development⁶⁹

Understanding the partnering process and the characteristics of a successful strategic partnership helps explain how partnering is best defined for BPC purposes. Engagement represents the consideration of pursuing a relationship and considers the nature of that relationship. Partnering is the process by which effective strategic partnerships are built. Partnering may or may not lead to a longer term strategic partnership as the different states’ interests evolve. States may engage in partnering activities for expedient reasons or find that, in the long term, the pursuit of a strategic partnership is contrary to or incompatible with national values and interests. Further, British doctrine argues successful strategic partnerships exhibit six overarching characteristics in their development and sustainment:

- **Political Nature.** Strategic partnerships and the decisions to develop them are political in nature, based on the success or potential success

of engagement on many levels. Partnerships and their development are consequently always conditional and subject to the needs of each participant's policy as interests and perceived success in their pursuit changes.

- **Strategic Patience.** Development and sustainment of a partnership require strategic patience. It takes time to develop a new partnership with a state, and existing and emerging partnerships are often challenged by contrary interests and aspirations or nuanced differences in shared interests or differing ideas about how to best pursue mutual interests based on culture and sovereign interpretation of domestic and international conditions.
- **Compromise.** States differ in the range and nature of their multiple interests and their outlooks about how to balance and achieve often contradictory interests. Effective partnerships mold these disparities into a cohesive whole through focusing on shared interests and priorities and compromises where necessary and possible.
- **Cultural Astuteness.** Cultures among states and within states vary. Successful partnerships are founded in a high degree of cultural astuteness that appreciates these differences with and within the partner state and at home. The mechanisms and functioning of successful partnerships show an understanding of the range of cultural structures from social to institutional.
- **Self-Reliance.** Successful strategic partnerships are rooted in a high degree of self-reliance of the individual partners in regard to their own internal security, governance and economy. Such self-reliance is the measure of the capacity of the individual states and what they might contribute toward the partnership goals. The less the dependency on the partnership for internal needs, the greater the self-respect of a host nation and the more open and honest its voice in the partnership.
- **Mutual Respect.** Mutual respect characterizes successful partnership. It is essential to a spirit of friendship and cooperation. Mutual respect is founded in an appreciation of what each partner contributes to the shared goals of partnership—the political necessity, the material and moral contributions and costs, and the levels of risks for each. It is often reflected in the degrees of acceptance, humility, assertiveness accepted, and trust. It is a fundamental recognition that others'

perspectives and judgment have value, and that in any particular circumstance they just may be right.⁷⁰

Thus, when considering BPC as a concept, the goal of the partnering must be kept firmly in mind and its status under constant review. Partnering and strategic partnerships are serious political decisions at the highest levels and require consideration of many factors. However, ultimately the answer to any particular question in regard to a factor does not determine whether partnering or BPC goes forward. The criticality of interests and the policymaker's judgment are the determinate elements. However, certain questions provide insights to that judgment and considerations for changes during the partnering process. Among these are:

- What is strategically critical about the host nation that requires partnering? Why invest effort and resources in BPC?
- What are all the interests of the states involved? Where are they shared and where do they differ? When and how might they change? Can the states make the compromises in differing interests to accommodate each other?
- Who internally or externally might work against the partnering? What internally or externally might work against the partnering? Can these be overcome or mitigated?
 - What is the host nations' relationship with its neighbors?
 - Are there any severe negative influences such as terrorists or transnational criminal groups within the host state?
 - What is the state of civil-military relations within the state?
 - What are the potential cultural issues?
- How economically viable is the host state?
- What is the character of the host (partnering) government? What are the moral and ethical consequences and implications of supporting or aligning with a potential partner?
- How politically stable is the government? How is power shared within the host state? How modern is governance within the host state? How effective is governance?
- What is the level of corruption within the society?
- How effective is internal and external security? Are there border security issues or ungoverned spaces? What is quality of security forces?

- What are the common key conditions that need to be achieved before the partnering can be considered effective or a strategic partnership is fully achieved? How might these be achieved over time?⁷¹

These questions, while not exhaustive, illustrate the 21st century concerns for what a successful state is in an environment of positive competition. The answers to such questions determine the appropriateness of a prospective state to partnering and the parameters of any capacity building. Understanding, engagement, partnering, and strategic partnership set the boundaries for all that occurs in BPC. They define what must occur from the top down and suggest parameters for understanding the state of progress from the bottom up. Thus, in building partner security capacity, military strategists, planners, and decision-makers must keep in mind the political nature and strategic purpose of the activity, which includes the interests of the states involved, the nature of the existing relationship, and the states' desires for the future of the relationship.⁷²

British joint doctrine also defines "partnering" with indigenous security forces:

[A]n approach to relationship building through direct assistance and shared endeavour that creates the right conditions, spirit and capabilities to achieve a formal and enduring strategic partnership. It is effectively the approach by which a partnership is built over time through the provision of direct assistance. Direct external assistance is provided through mentoring, advice, support and training by all of the sponsor government's agencies.⁷³

While written with a focus on intervention, the definition captures much of the essence of what is important for BPC in regard to partnering across the spectrum of states. Partnering as a process leads to and sustains strategic partnerships over time. It is founded in shared interests and objectives, and seeks to acquire and exhibit the characteristics inherent to a strategic partnership. It is implemented through the activities of BPC, which include mentoring, advice, support, and training. In well-developed partnerships, the activities of partnering may be more or less institutionalized, and expertise may flow more equally between partners, but are nonetheless essential to sustenance and, when properly pursued, enhance the capabilities and capacity of all participants. Hence, partnering and BPC activities considerations are

one and the same, and the pursuit of BPC and the choices of partners are inseparable to some degree in all domains and at all levels.

In the VUCA of the 21st century, the United States must be clear about what it stands for and where its true interests lie. Not everyone is a potential strategic partner, and partnering activities must fall along a continuum based on strategic value or necessity. Strategists, planners, and decision-makers must develop the strategic understanding to identify those nations that are critical to and appropriate for strategic partnership in order to best serve U.S. interests and invest limited BPC resources wisely. They must seek to avoid building capacity where it could be counterproductive to our long-term values, even when expediency might argue otherwise. When

... the pursuit of BPC and the choices of partners are inseparable to some degree in all domains and at all levels.

expediency wins out, BPC should be as limited as possible. They must act as good stewards of resources and power sharing. Building partnership capacity as a strategic concept requires holistic understanding in its conception and in its execution. It requires an appreciation of the characteristics and principles of partnering and strategic partnerships. Only then can a shared vision of a favorable world order, shared interests, and shared understanding of the strategic and operational environments be articulated and achieved, and an enduring security structure come into being.

5. Capacity, Resiliency, and the Security Sector

Earlier, this monograph argued that in the complex and interconnected environment of the 21st century, every state is at risk to some degree of fragility or failure. Therefore, it is in the interests of all states who are part of the positive U.S.-inspired international order to continuously enhance their internal development and support the building of successful modern states around the globe. Clearly, U.S. policy has embraced this logic:

[W]e are supporting political and economic reform and deepening partnerships to ensure regional security ... we are joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity.⁷⁴

This policy recognizes that a favorable international environment requires more than a successful superpower policing the global commons—it requires a community of successful states united in universal values and committed to do what is needed for prosperity, stability, and security. However, as more and more of the so-called fragile or failed states rely on continued international intervention and assistance to meet their populations' needs, it is increasingly apparent to donor nations and organizations that outside assistance, while often essential in the immediate term, is neither sufficient nor sustainable in the longer run and creates its own issues of dependency, corruption, and potential conflict. The consensus of experience and research is that successful states and a favorable and stable international order require more effective capacity building within the assisted nations.⁷⁵ Enduring success hinges on a better strategic understanding of state capacity and resiliency, capacity building, and security sector reform.

Capacity and Resiliency⁷⁶

At its broadest, the capacity of the state is the sum of the power of the whole of the state and its people, and their talent and willingness in developing, integrating, and using the state's power within the circumstances in which the state finds itself. Hence, capacity is always about tangible and intangible

state resources—the sum of a state’s realized and potential power to act within the strategic context. For example, Iraq possesses oil reserves and realizes revenue from them. Yet, Iraq also possesses great human potential—an intangible resource it has not yet been able to bring to bear fully on its problems as a result of ethnic and religious divisions and external actor interference.

State power can best be understood from the perspective of elements and instruments of power available to the state. The elements of power consist of broad natural and social determinants. Natural determinants are such things as geography, population, and natural resources. Social determinants are the economic, military, political, and socio-psychological power within a state. “Elements of power measure a nation’s [inherent] capacity to do something and are a measure of potential power. Instruments of power are tools that can be applied and are a measure of capability. Instruments—usable power—are the potential of the capacity converted to capabilities.”⁷⁷

The equation for the actual power of the state is the ability to generate the appropriate instruments for the circumstances plus government effectiveness plus the national will to act. At the highest level and at its best, this realized capacity is the measure of the aggregate ability of the state to exercise its sovereign responsibilities internally and externally. It encompasses the physical and social-psychological attributes of the state and its peoples. However, capacity is neither ideal nor constant; it is always contextual and subject to changing conditions and perceptions. Understanding of and experience in applying its capacity by a government and its population is directly related to a state’s resilience.

Resiliency in a state is the potential ability of a state as a complex system to confront new challenges or recover from crisis or longer term strategic setbacks. It is a part and enhancer of state capacity. Strategic setbacks are circumstances so significant that they threaten to overwhelm the existing capacity of the state and its people to sustain appropriate levels of success for a fully functioning 21st century state. Consequently, strategic setbacks invariably pose questions of legitimacy and challenges to sovereignty for the governments of states. Humanitarian crises from natural disasters and conflict are obvious examples of potential setbacks. Economic failure or long term economic or political stagnation can also pose such a setback. In some cases, a state can be simply a victim of the ongoing changes in the globalized economy or perceived relative disadvantage.

Resiliency within a state consists of three fundamental components: the amount of change a state can undergo and still retain control over its functions and structure; the degree to which the state can successfully self-organize in the face of a challenge or change; and the respective society's ability to build and increase its capacity for learning and adaptation to overcome the setback.⁷⁸ Resiliency in a state also is related to its geography: location, terrain, resources, and peoples.

The United Nations defines resiliency from a disaster perspective as:

The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.⁷⁹

Resiliency of the state therefore has physical, social, and cultural aspects. It is about the geography of the state and the state's human systems—spanning all aspects of a state's capacity: power in terms of resources, capabilities, abilities, identity, confidence, and will. The assessment of such potential in the present time, informed by the state's history and culture, provides an estimation of the aggregate resiliency of a particular state. A weak resiliency makes recovery or confrontation of new challenges more problematic: a stronger resiliency makes rapid recovery and adaptation more probable. In either case, a state's resiliency is always a primary strategic consideration in capacity-building. On one hand, how its potentials can be used and the synergies that may be created among its components in regard to the setback and its consequences determine resiliency's role and value in any consideration of a capacity-building strategy for a host state. On the other hand, in building capacity, resiliency must be one of many objectives because the development of resiliency is the key to a more rapid and less costly recovery in future strategic setbacks.

Resiliency can be usefully assessed in different areas, at different levels, and for differing contexts—sector, function, local, national, institutional, departmental, natural disaster, war, etc.—but a state's actual resiliency remains a sum of the whole and the interaction among the subsystems and context as influenced by internal leadership and external factors. At state

level, resiliency is a strategic concept to be pursued, and by definition is related to capacity, adaptability, interaction, and will. While it cannot be predicted with certainty, its assessment by sponsoring states is important because it provides insights in regard to strategic questions such as whether to intervene, what expectations should be in regard to plausible end states, what objectives to seek, what concepts best serve the objectives, and what potential costs and risks are involved. Such consideration shapes how capacity building is pursued. Resiliency assessment has value at the tactical and operational levels also, but must always be understood in the context of the broader strategic picture and seek to contribute to positive synergistic connections in strategy's ends, ways, and means.

A Strategic Perspective of Capacity Building⁸⁰

From a 21st century strategic perspective, capacity building consists of those decisions, processes, and activities undertaken by a host nation and its citizens and international supporters to more effectively and efficiently develop, amplify, and apply its inherent elements of power in order to best serve its citizens while participating positively in a competitive globalized world order. Such a perspective has significant implications for how assistance and capacity building should be approached.⁸¹

Capacity building can occur between and among long-term strategic partner states and successful states of vastly different relative power, as well as between successful states and troubled states. Much of the former capacity building undertakings are considered a part of normalized relations among these states. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan refocused the U.S. government on capacity building in troubled states; however, the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had already discovered that such states needed more than traditional aid. Any fragile, failing, and failed state is the result of diminished relative capacity caused by internal or external factors—or some combination of both. Relative to the challenges it confronts, whether social, economic, or conflict related, the state and its people lack the necessary capacity and resiliency to overcome the adversity and challenges confronting them. Traditional aid can provide temporary relief, but to be successful, the state must develop the internal capacity to confront and overcome challenges. Consequently, capacity building is an appropriate strategic response to any challenge to a state's success. Building

partnership capacity is the U.S. government's strategic concept for helping selected other states build their capacity.

The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, a well-respected joint civil-military guide for stability operations, defines capacity building as: "The transfer of technical knowledge and skills to host nation individuals and institutions to help them develop effective processes and administer state services across the economic, social, political, and security realms."⁸² U.S. Army doctrine defines BPC as "the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions."⁸³ These definitions are helpful but not sufficient in and of themselves to produce an effective capacity-building strategic perspective.

Nonetheless, the definitions do recognize shared interests and the holistic nature of state capacity, and taken together suggest a potential definition of BPC as a strategic concept:

BPC is a multifaceted concept involving the integrated application of tactical, operational, and strategic actions and resources from differing governmental and nongovernmental actors and agencies over time to enhance a sovereign partner state's institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining security and clear societal goals (ends), guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. BPC is inherently complex and involves issues of sovereignty, legitimacy, and human security. BPC may include multiple, smaller-scale activities that occur simultaneously, sequentially, or singularly. These small-scale activities focus on building specific capacities and capabilities and creating intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term security and stability interests of the partner state and the United States.

Capacity building is complex, interrelated, and multidisciplinary (See Figure 8). A recent RAND study on countries emerging from conflict lists the major economic capacity areas as: humanitarian assistance; infrastructure; agriculture; currencies, budgets, banking and finance, and foreign trade; private sector development and employment generation; and natural resource management. It listed the processes involved as: creating physical security, providing jobs, undertaking policy reforms, reconstructing infrastructure

and providing public services, and building institutional capacity.⁸⁴ Economics is only one area of capacity building, but it demonstrates the complexity and systemic nature of any capacity building. The economic sector interrelates and interacts with other sectors such as security and governance.

Any U.S. partner building capacity endeavor has potential strategic implications for the host nation and the United States. As a result, capacity-building assistance must be proactive and anticipate how the host nation will fit productively into the world order. It cannot try to reconstruct the host nation's past, but rather must bridge the nation's past with an emerging positive future. To do this, both the host government and donor states and organizations must arrive at and pursue compatible policies and strategies. Hence, capacity building is founded in effective partnering within the state, and between the state and its external supporters. The host state's sovereign efforts are the base on which all must be built.

Capacity building must be considered from a holistic perspective. Success does not flow from the "best possible" improvement of any particular aspect of a state's power, but from the integrated development of all aspects with emphasis placed in order to gain synergies leading to a fully functioning and resilient state. A picture-perfect military security sector that the economic base of the state cannot support does not result in a viable state. An ideal economic structure without an adequate security infrastructure will also falter. States that lack adequate strength in any sector are at risk. Nonetheless, capacity building must center on some root source or sources of state power that form the basis of future viability. Singapore assured its future by focusing on human capital.⁸⁵ And while human capital is always important, other states have focused on inherent natural resources, international commerce, and other inherent or created strengths for international competitiveness. Yet, the holistic nature of state capacity argues that building partnership capacity requires holistic approaches at the higher levels and BPC activities at any level must be cognitive of and appropriately consider the interconnectedness of the sectors of state capacity.

In developing ways forward, context matters. The physical geographic environment, international dynamics, domestic fiscal and political environments, culture, expectations, talents, and will of all participants matter. Both the United States Institute of Peace and RAND studies emphasize context—past, present, and future.⁸⁶ Success is always a factor of the host nation's past experience, what needs to be achieved, and the expectations of the people

affected. A strategic perspective helps communicate to the various audiences what is being done and why. In this regard, it makes clear the distinction between immediate humanitarian and security needs and the building of longer term capacity. Effective shared strategic communications by the host nation and other actors must manage the population's expectations by openly addressing successes and failures; countering opposing forces, whether military or ideological; and building local ownership.




Figure 8. Complexity of Capacity Building

Capacity building is inherently a human enterprise and not solely a consideration of objective factors. Belief systems, resistance to change, and human fallacies may be sources of friction and must be anticipated. For example, modern governance builds capacity—international good will, resource management, human capital, rule of law, security, and viable economic systems—that empower citizens to take advantage of competitive opportunities. Consequently, in many states good governance often works against existing elites—political, economic, military, social, religious, etc.—who cannot or do not want to compete in an open society. Such elites may prefer to see the population trapped in a painful status quo rather than risk their own advantageous status in progressive change. Change threatens some and provides opportunities for others. In the latter case, the opportunists may or may not serve positive purposes.

Ultimately, capacity building is manifested as projects to be implemented, but they must be founded in and linked and integrated together through a

strategic perspective. If they are not, unintended consequences follow. For example, it is possible for external actors to exceed the capacity of the host nation to accept the supporting actors' assistance or for supporting states and non-state actors to have more resources than they have the capacity to deliver and manage. It is also possible for unrealistic demands of a host to exceed the capacity or will of others to help. When these circumstances exist, trust is often lost and unfavorable second and third effects develop. Such unintended consequences can include rises in corruption, crime, inflation, dependency, redundant or unneeded projects and programs, a lack of indigenous ownership, increasing issues of effectiveness and efficiency, and indigenous opposition and resentment. These types of issues, once manifested, create additional opportunities for political and criminal opportunists and lead to greater unintended and undesirable effects. Sequential and cumulative strategies are potential ways to compensate for expectations—resource mismatch. If action appears overriding, then migration strategies and contingency planning become priorities. In either case, effective strategic communications are paramount.

However, capacity building must focus on long-term success of the state. While any good capacity-building approach would seek to be efficient, it cannot favor efficiency at the expense of effectiveness. The greater efficiency and effectiveness for both the host nation and donors comes from future state viability and resilience. A strategic perspective minimizes harm while creating near- and long-term opportunities for recovery and future growth at the local and state levels. External assistance in capacity building is often sorely needed and strategically appropriate. However, get BPC wrong and the situation potentially worsens, and someone has to go back and undo the damage.

Security Sector⁸⁷

The U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) primary responsibility in BPC is in the security sector. However, this responsibility is not as straightforward as it may initially appear. First, the expectations of "security" from government today are much greater. National defense and protection from unlawful use of force internally are baselines, but populations' expectations of security also include such social freedoms as economic opportunity, employment, education, health care, intellectual freedom, and social mobility. The ways of

providing this greater human security may vary by state, but the expectations of a modern social contract are clear, as the Arab Spring illustrates. While the military is not directly responsible for these broader aspects of security, these aspects do affect the citizen's expectations of what security forces are and how they go about defense and security responsibilities. Second, capacity building is holistic and complex in nature and the changes in the security sector or any other sector potentially affect all the other systems that constitute the state. The complexity and difficulty of building partner capacity in the security sector changes with the success of the state, the challenges confronting the state, and its population's expectations. In the words of Bernard Brodie:

Security is, after all, a derivative value, being meaningful only in so far as it promotes and maintains other values which have been or are being realized and are thought worth securing, though in proportion to the magnitude of the threat it may displace all others in primacy.⁸⁸

Security as a broader and expanding concept is not a new idea. It was instrumental in the success of the Western democracies in the struggle with communist ideology. In large part, it created the conditions for the Western globalized economic order that ultimately exposed the fallacy of the communist system and led to its collapse. It represented a major reform in the state's security sector and laid the foundation for the West's success, and globalization and democratization were its essential companions. This imperative of security sector reform applies to any state that desires to compete successfully in the globalized economy—and stability in the international order as the United States desires, it is also dependent on successful security sector reform within the participating states. Hence, it is critical that policymakers and military professionals understand what the modern security sector is, the issues associated with it, and how BPC interrelates with it.

What is security sector reform? If we adhered to a broad human security model as discussed above, security sector reform would be everything from physical security to economic and social well-being, as well as stable governance and rule of law. It would be everything, therefore it would be nothing—and impossible to address. Fortunately, there is a wide field of literature that provides a consensus on a useful definition and models for security sector reform. In the reconstruction efforts following the collapse

of communism, assisting states and others found that if these states were to successfully compete in a globalized economy and provide a broader level of human security, they must first successfully reform their security sectors. From this and other experiences in a study of post-conflict and fragile states, the U.S. government rightly concludes the security sector in a modern 21st century state provides an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. It consists of the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities by which the government assures its citizens safety, security, and justice.⁸⁹ This U.S. definition embraces the essentiality of representative governance. It is true that non-representative states can provide safety and security—a sense of stability, but often at the cost of justice and with a lack of transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to their populations. Such states will ultimately fail to meet the legitimate and perceived needs of their citizens or be able to succeed in a positively competing international order. Consequently, they will be a source of instability as opposed to a contributing partner to international stability.

The security sector of a state consists of both external and internal security dimensions—challenges and requirements from outside the state and needs within the state. The state requires security providers for both aspects, even though some forces may function in either (See Figure 9). Formal security providers are organized in various forms of military, paramilitary, and law enforcement structures: military forces—armies, navies, air forces, and marines; border security forces, customs authorities, and coast guards; intelligence services; civilian police and specialized police units; national guards and government militias; and other security and civil defense units. States have various ways of categorizing these formal security forces, but in properly functioning states they share the common attribute of responsiveness to and support of the state. In theory, through these forces, the state maintains territorial and sovereign security against external threats, maintains a monopoly over the use of violence internally, and provides for public order and physical security. Modern successful states provide the security that enables suitable economic, political, and social development.

Other non-state security providers may exist within a state and contribute or detract from security and the state's sovereignty and legitimacy. Non-state security and justice providers are those nongovernmental agencies or individuals who have varying degrees of formal and informal jurisdiction.

Religious or traditional justice systems are examples of potential positive contributors to the security sector while political paramilitary and criminal organizations are possible detractors. Context often determines the role and value of non-state security providers. Informal or traditional justice systems or even neighbor watch groups may enhance security, if united in common purpose with positive government goals. However, non-state militias, criminal organizations, and forces loyal to political opportunists or spoilers may constitute a challenge to the state's role and effectiveness in providing suitable modern security. In addition, outside agitators, such as international crime or business, other states, and special interest groups, may adversely influence internal security. Internal security is complex and the dynamics can spill over into other states.⁹⁰

Designated security providers are only one part of a functioning modern security sector. Government security management and oversight bodies are also an essential element. These formal and informal bodies largely integrated within the state governmental structure oversee the security forces and agencies of the state. They may be part of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, or specially designated commissions and review boards. In modern states they usually include the office of the president (or chief executive), the various ministries with security related responsibilities—defense, public administration, interior, justice, and foreign affairs; the judiciary; oversight committees within legislative bodies; and others within government who have responsibilities related to the provision of state security. Such bodies ensure security providers serve the state with efficacy and in a lawful manner. If such bodies are unprepared, incompetent, corrupted, or nonexistent, the security sector is weakened, as well as governance and development.⁹¹

Designated security providers are only one part of a functioning modern security sector.

Civil society also plays a vital role in over-watching the security sector through the media, related professional organizations, think tanks, academia, and advocacy groups. These may be international or domestic entities and cooperation is increasing between international and domestic civil actors, and among disparate organizations. These groups critique and advise the security organizations and policymakers, as well as keep the public informed. Good state security is a product of a constructive interaction

among all these actors and agencies. Consequently, security sector reform must appreciate and address each.

With over 20 years of experience in security sector reform, the international community's success has been mixed and somewhat frustrating. Nonetheless, trends in the international security environment suggest that in the next two decades, all states will need to reform their security sectors and many of them will need assistance. The developed democratic states appear to be able to transform to meet the new challenges proffered by globalization, albeit slowly, and not without some suffering and fiscal costs. Nonetheless, unless the greater part of the states makes this transformation to a 21st century security model, the benefits of globalization will remain too inequitable and global instability will increase. The rising tide of economic expansion will recede, and in its falling all states within the system and their populations will suffer. The point has already been made that the United States cannot continue to bear its current costs in international security. The 2010 Defense Strategic Guidance advances BPC as a strategic concept for sharing this security burden. But as this monograph has argued, the DOD concept of BPC must be executed with an understanding of the larger strategic frameworks of modernization, globalization, state-building, and security sector reform that sustains a favorable world order for the United States. BPC in any environment by any U.S. agency should not be executed as a series of unrelated activities. Each activity must be an integrated part of this larger strategic purpose.




Figure 9. Actors Within the Security Sector⁹²

BPC Posits⁹³

Developing a strategic perspective of BPC can be a daunting task; however, much has been learned about working within other states, particularly with the international community's experience with disaster assistance, state failure, and conflict over the last two decades. From the experience and evolving research literature and military doctrine, it is possible to posit a series of statements that outline such a perspective that can be applied to the specifics of any environment where BPC is relevant.

- *BPC is a strategic concept serving specific strategic objectives.* Consequently, BPC activities are defined by and serve a strategic purpose. Both the strategic purpose and the specific strategic objectives must be understood to properly develop and execute operational and tactical plans.
- *BPC is a sovereign matter and therefore inherently political in nature.* BPC raises issues of sovereignty (Who is in charge and responsible at what point?) and legitimacy (Is this the right policy for the government and is it being pursued appropriately?). Ultimately, the domestic politics within a supporting state or organization and the domestic politics within the host nation will determine the type, level, and duration of capacity building undertaken. These domestic decisions are influenced by the political interaction and decisions of other regional and global actors.

Local ownership is key to the equilibrium of sovereignty and legitimacy in reforming states. Assistance can come in many forms, but success requires that the reforming state exert sovereignty in a legitimate manner. BPC requires political will equivalent to the level of effort desired.

- *BPC is inherently a partnering enterprise.* It is not a singular activity and success requires effective collaboration. All participants must be committed and involved. Relationship building at every level is important. Proper relationships build trust and encourage constructive risk taking. Relationships bridge the gap among conflicting values, interests, and cultures, and the gaps between perceived needs and available resources. Creating sound and enduring relationships may be an equal imperative to planning and resources.

The end state of the collaboration must be understood. Is the

partnering expedient or does it aspire to a true strategic partnership?

A clear conveyance and understanding of the interests of all involved is imperative. While compromise by one or both partners is inherent to some degree in an effective partnership, the failure to adequately address the legitimate interests of any partner affects the success of BPC. In particular, there has to be a quid pro quo between interveners and the host nation to engage in a cooperative venture to ensure stability. In a similar manner, differing priorities and timelines are matters of negotiation. Strategy and planning by the host nation and supporting states or organizations—in a collaborative partnership—create a framework for properly integrated actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

- *BPC is context dependent.* National cultural, economic, political, military, physical, and socio-psychological conditions define context and matter. Organizational cultures, individual personalities, and local and international conditions also define the context in which BPC is pursued. The nature of BPC activities and progress is defined by the opportunities and obstacles presented by these dimensions and the interactions among them. By understanding and accommodating context, assisting partners facilitate change and are less apt to create unforeseen issues. In turn, by appreciating the context in which supporting actors work, the host nation can temper expectations and advocate viable solutions to issues and problems.
- *BPC may create security dilemmas for internal populations, elites, and other regional and global actors.* What looks like right to one actor creates threats and opportunities for others. Change frightens individuals and threatens existing power relationships. External and internal actors are logically more active because interests are more clearly affected. BPC activity may create greater instability unless such concerns are alleviated or channeled toward positive ends. Reactions occur at individual, local, national, regional, and global levels. Successful BPC is dependent on the resolution of these internal and external security dilemmas. Consequently, negotiation is inherent to BPC strategies and relationships and trust matter.
- *BPC is integrative and interdependent in nature.* Changes in state capacity within any sector potentially affect other sectors of state governance and the greater society. Progress in one aspect is invariably

dependent on relative progress in other dimensions, such as the reciprocal dependency between security and economic development. Changes may also have implications beyond the borders of the state. Consequently, any BPC strategy requires comprehensive and whole of government perspectives in its formulation and execution.

- *BPC's foci must be sustainability, capacity building, and resilience.* Emergency conditions call for extraordinary solutions, but enduring success requires a more judicious approach. Whatever solution is pursued, it must be sustainable over the long run. This means it must be affordable and appropriate for the society. It must lay a foundation for continued improvement and the ability to recover in the face of significant setbacks, not set an unsustainable standard. Capabilities have their place and they need to be sufficient, but they must also be considered in light of capacity and resiliency. First-class technology and world-class facilities mean little to building capacity and resiliency if they cannot be repaired or staffed.

Capacity is difficult to build, but can be lost quickly and easily through indifference, corruption, or corrosion. Any BPC effort must consider in advance how the capacity will be sustained.

These foci are derived from lessons that have emerged in security sector reform assistance. Incorporating principles of good governance and respect for human rights into such assistance programs contributes to a reform that is sustainable and self-adjusting. It gives the state legitimacy and ensures that state sovereignty is exercised in accordance with rule of law. Balancing operational support with institutional reform contributes to the assisted state's capacity to sustain and adapt the security sector, as well as build a resiliency within the state apparatus to deal with future challenges.

- *BPC requires effective direction and monitoring to ensure efforts remain aligned with and focused on supporting mutual interests.* Priorities must be set at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and those charged with implementing these priorities must be empowered to act and success or failure must be monitored.
- *BPC must possess a sense of timeliness at all levels.* BPC efforts must consider what is needed and when it is needed, neither delivering too little too late, or too much too soon. Decisions at the highest level must consider and manage the implementation time to use the right

level of effort at the right time, and implementers must ensure this alignment and manage progress on the ground so that partners are not overwhelmed by the BPC effort or emerging strategic events. Timeliness is achieved by balancing policy and progress against potential or unfolding events.

- *BPC must consider continuity.* BPC efforts must consider the issues of continuity associated with changing leader personalities, personnel turnover, politics, and strategic conditions. Continuity considerations require the examination of alternative futures, shape expectations, and lead to more realistic objectives.
- *BPC must possess a degree of agility—the ability to adjust to unforeseen needs or the pace of progress.* Agility is engendered by planning for and empowering lower levels to make adjustments in scheduling and methodologies (activities) in the face of new or unforeseen circumstances. Agility is facilitated by learning and adaptation at all levels. Agility keeps activities on the ground aligned with strategic purpose while dealing with negative unforeseen consequences or taking advantage of positive ones. Agility is flexibility supported by empowerment and informed by purpose, perspective, and knowledge of the facts on the ground.
- *BPC must be resourced relative to needs and progress, not to artificial constructs or unfounded aspirations.* It is possible for the BPC vision to outstrip the capacity of the resources of both the donor and the host nations. When this occurs, the solutions to the capability shortcomings, because they are ad hoc and unrelated to capacity potential, often create opportunities for antagonists and lead to unintended and undesirable second- and third-order effects. Sequential and cumulative strategies are potential ways to expand the time range of the vision. If immediate action is paramount, then migration strategies and contingency planning become priorities to compensate for any incurred risks.
 - Experience has shown that local solutions that meet the local needs in ways that do not hinder further progress may be more optimal than implementing outside solutions, even when the latter are well-financed. Funding that is not linked to real needs and enduring progress leads to disappointment within the population and potential corruption and power plays.

- Parsimony is an emerging guiding principle in state-building because it recognizes multiple resource challenges, discourages redundancy, and reinforces indigenous ownership. A proper balance of resources must be found for the circumstances and sustained over time.
- *Human capital is perhaps the most important resource, and quality is a force multiplier, whether it is U.S. or indigenous personnel.* When the size and nature of the footprint—or troop presence—may be counterproductive to long-term goals, the quality of the personnel and forces becomes paramount. The need for quality personnel and forces increases with VUCA.
- *BPC must consider security.* Security must be considered on various levels, ranging from physical security of U.S. supporting personnel and equipment, to operational and technical security.
- *BPC must be supported by strategic communications efforts.* Building networks of willing actors and supportive populations is essential to making BPC a success. BPC must be explained in acceptable terms to multiple audiences. Leaders need to build individual, collective, and common understandings at the same time. At the strategic level, leaders must constantly and consistently communicate to their subordinates and partners, indigenous and domestic populations, and other global actors and populations why BPC efforts are necessary and how they will unfold. Sincerity, honesty, and unity of voice count. Hubris detracts from intent and slows momentum.

Comprehending BPC from a theoretical and strategic perspective allows us to better formulate a specific strategy and pursue that myriad of ideas and activities that constitute capacity building in general or within the security sector. While each BPC undertaking is unique, theory and aids such as these posits can help in any effort. They establish the proper mindset and suggest considerations and approaches as well as remind us of the pitfalls. Capacity building without strategic understanding and consideration of partnering ends and resiliency risks becoming just a series of activities that waste limited resources to little avail.

6. Unraveling the Military BPC Enigma⁹⁴

Building partnership capacity reentered the interagency lexicon and military thought as a major strategic concept with the DOD Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) of 2006 and 2010, and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. However, assisting the militaries of other states has a long history in U.S. policy. Military assistance in various forms has been used as a means of building the military capacity of allied and coalition states, as a diplomatic inducement or signal, as a way to achieve presence and basing rights, to empower particular actors within a region or state, and various other quid pro quo arrangements. Often in the past, U.S. military forces have played roles in building the capacity of government and society beyond the security sector. Such policy has not been without controversy internally and externally. Internally the result has been legislation to restrict and guide the executive branch in its use. Such policy and its execution are also subject to concerns of legitimacy and legalities within the international system and the host nation. In addition, DOD, joint, service, and SOF perspectives shape implementation of a BPC strategy. Consequently, despite a long history, military BPC strategy remains confusing and at times frustrating because of the different authorities and funding; policy and legislative perspectives and prerogatives; differences in DOD, joint staff, and combatant commander (CCDR) viewpoints; and service interpretations of roles and the place of BPC in doctrinal missions.⁹⁵ Such issues, legalities, and perspectives must be understood as part of a strategic perspective.

Legalities, Authorities, Responsibilities, and Legitimacy

Capacity-building activities are intertwined with issues of legality, authority, responsibility, and legitimacy on every level, from the strategic to the tactical. All capacity-building activities have legal and legitimacy dimensions—one of laws and rules, and of perceptions—that must be considered in strategy, planning, and execution. Rule of law is a fundamental value for the United States and its 21st century constructs for world order, and thus adherence to domestic and international law underpins the legitimacy of all U.S. activities among domestic and international audiences. Simply stated, there must be a legal basis for any activity, and it must be conducted in a

lawful manner. Laws are black and white statements that set boundaries, frame intent, and often establish authorities and responsibilities. However, no law can enshrine everything, nor should it. In BPC, much is left to executive and departmental policy and doctrine, and accepted practice. And beyond the fundamental need to respect domestic and international law, the idea of legitimacy supposes a broader moral dimension that encompasses doing what is right in terms of U.S. espoused values and commonly accepted ideas of fairness and justice.

In the balance of power enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Congress has necessary and enduring responsibilities in regard to the U.S. military that includes BPC in its various forms. Their interest and power are reflected in “a diverse portfolio of legislative authorities, reporting requirements, and congressional oversight functions.”⁹⁶ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195) gives the Department of State (DOS) the primary responsibility, authority, and funding to conduct U.S. foreign assistance and encompasses any and all assistance to a foreign nation, including security assistance. Titles 10 and 22, United States Code (USC) and provisions within the annual National Defense Authorization Acts are the legal authorities that govern security cooperation activities of the U.S. military. In addition, the chief of mission of the U.S. embassy must approve all security cooperation activities conducted in a foreign country.

Title 10 military authorities are limited and include: certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance. Under this authority, U.S. military personnel are invited as administrative and technical experts by the host nation. It does not authorize U.S. forces to train or equip partner nation militaries. Direct involvement in operations is not authorized. The authority for training and equipping foreign security forces is in Title 22, USC, and all training and equipping of foreign forces must be specifically authorized.⁹⁷ The laws frame what is allowed and, to a degree, constrain what initiative can do. One of the biggest drawbacks is that this legislation, with its authorization and appropriations processes, can limit responsiveness and the ability to sustain long-term assistance.⁹⁸

Other legislation also affects what can be done and how it can be pursued. For example, the Leahy Amendment to the Department of Defense FY1999 Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-262) was added to the legislation because of concern over supporting regimes that violated human rights. While the

Secretary of Defense can waive this, waivers raise regulatory issues and invite greater oversight. Later legislation prohibits assistance to foreign militaries whose past abuses have not been punished.⁹⁹ Any Defense Authorization Bill may have other restrictions or guidance in regard to assistance, or such may be buried in legislation focused on other departments or issues. The legislative pathway is complicated and generally requires legal review of any BPC strategy and its supporting activities to ensure compliance.

“National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization” provides Presidential guidance on reconstruction and stabilization. It states that the Department of State is the lead agency and will harmonize efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.¹⁰⁰ Department of Defense policy implementing NSPD 44 is found in DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.¹⁰¹ The latter states that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and are conducted across the spectrum of conflict. Stability operations is “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”¹⁰²

Thus, stability operations include all military BPC and other forms of assistance. NSPD 44 charges CCDRs to engage relevant partners and reinforces the whole of government and comprehensive nature of these types of operations.¹⁰³ For DOD, national strategic purpose, supported by this framework, is achieved through the flow and interaction of objectives and guidance from the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, theater and organizational strategies, and planning and execution. All are informed by emerging or more specific policy guidance and key documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and various strategic assessments. Other departments, such as DOS, have their own processes and documents that should be considered within military strategy and planning. Within DOD, specific guidance is provided in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and Guidance for Employment of the Force. From these classified documents, CCDRs and service chiefs get

comprehensive directions for planning, force management, security cooperation, Theater Campaign Plans, and strategic end states for each Combatant Command.¹⁰⁴

U.S. legalities, guidance, and intent complicate as well as inform any BPC strategy and associated planning and execution. U.S. domestic law, as discussed previously, applies as do U.S. policies and regulations. Often these differ according to agencies, partners or recipients, and types of capacity-building functions or capabilities involved. An overarching legal framework must be established for each capacity-building strategy that provides guidance and structure for operational planning and tactical activities. The framework must be consistent with U.S. obligations in international law, issued rules of engagement (ROE), and applicable domestic law, as well as relevant aspects of international human rights, rights and obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or bilateral and multilateral agreements. Fairness and justice implications must always be a part of deliberations. Lawyers are essential in the construction of the framework, but it is the leaders, planners, and operators that must ensure adherence to the letter of the law and maintain the mantle of legitimacy.¹⁰⁵

Legalities also exist in regard to host nation law, which must be understood and considered. The nuances of such law vary from country to country, and sometimes from province to province within a state. While for most U.S.-supported states the baseline protections represented by fundamental human rights law will apply, interpretation of these rights can be quite different and lead to issues that conflict with U.S. values and laws. Often a special legal status for U.S. military personnel in foreign countries must be codified in status-of-forces agreements or other documents. Without such agreements, host nation law may apply to U.S. personnel. Regardless, the legalities involved must be considered and applied. Such consideration shapes planning and execution, but may also necessitate additional training of personnel, or even preclude an operation.¹⁰⁶

Innovation is a necessary component of BPC. Eventually the current authorities and structures must be changed to facilitate the new realities of the more dynamic 21st century environment in which understanding and agility are instrumental to success. However, such change from Congress is apt to be reluctant. Until change occurs, strategic understanding of the environment and of legalities, authorities, responsibilities, and legitimacy are the means of finding and advocating timely actions.

The BPC Matrix

A large number of existing and potential programs and activities might contribute to military BPC strategy, but confusion exists as a result of the authorities and legalities listed above and by issues in doctrine and vocabulary. In a 2011 white paper, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute identified the reasons and extent of this confusion and made recommendations for adjudication and agreement. They found a suitable framework integrating stability, irregular warfare, and security activities. *ADP 3-07 (FM 3-07) Stability*, 31 August 2012, following the white paper, provides a summary and an Army clarification of the relationship that guides this discussion. BPC is seen as a whole of government and comprehensive approach. These sources, like almost all U.S. strategy and doctrine, accept as a central tenet of national policy and strategic guidance that the Department of Defense must, through sustained military engagement support efforts to build partner capacity, shape the environment and create stability and security.¹⁰⁷

In military doctrine, much of BPC falls under the overarching rubric of stability operations.¹⁰⁸ Assistance rendered within a nation's territory may also be referred to as nation assistance. Nation assistance is an inclusive term defined and described as:

Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support the HN [host nation] by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and other Title 10, USC, programs. Collaborative planning between the JFC and interorganizational and HN authorities can greatly enhance the effectiveness of nation assistance. The JIACG can help facilitate this coordination. All nation assistance actions are integrated into the US ambassador's country plan.¹⁰⁹

Doctrinally, the U.S. military refers to a host nation perspective as internal defense and development (IDAD). IDAD is "the full range of measures

taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”¹¹⁰ Referring to its own activities in support of an IDAD, the U.S. uses the term foreign internal defense (FID), which is:

... the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.¹¹¹

FID is doctrinally broken down into three categories: Indirect Support, FID Direct Support, and FID Combat Operations, but they may occur simultaneously. FID indirect support includes the use of security assistance programs, military exchange programs, exercises, and other mechanisms to support building strong national infrastructures to build economic and military self-sufficiency. FID direct support (not involving combat operations) makes use of U.S. forces and capabilities through civil-military operations, military information support operations, communications and intelligence cooperation, mobility, and logistic support to assist the host nation and build capacity. U.S. FID combat operations bring U.S. combat power to bear in order to provide security so other FID operations can occur. FID combat operations require a Presidential decision and provide security until host nation forces are prepared.¹¹² FID must be consistent with U.S. national security policy and objectives. FID occurs across the range of military operations and can touch on any aspect of host nation security.¹¹³ Logically, FID focuses on building capacity since, as argued earlier, to expend effort in other nations without consideration of building capacity and resiliency risks strategic failure and wastage of resources.

In Figure 10, the joint range of military operations (ROMO) and Army spectrum of conflict and full spectrum operations are overlaid. The ROMO is expressed as:

1. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence,
2. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations, and
3. Major Operations and Campaigns.

The Army Spectrum of Conflict consists of:

1. Peacetime Military Engagement,
2. Peace Operations,
3. Limited Intervention,
4. Irregular Warfare, and
5. Major Combat Operations.

Full spectrum operations consists of offense, defense, and stability operations. As Army doctrine illustrates, the balance of offense, defense, and stability operations varies with the operational environment, but stability operations—and building partnership capacity—are a simultaneous and continuous consideration in all.




Figure 10. U.S. Army Themes with Joint Military Operations¹¹⁴

In the joint doctrinal lexicon, the term “major operations and campaigns” has replaced “major combat operations,” which previously conveyed the idea of general war. They are understood as “extended-duration, large-scale operations that usually involve combat.”¹¹⁵ Irregular warfare (IW) describes nontraditional warfare. It largely occurs in fragile, failing states, and failed

state scenarios and is defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population” that “often favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”¹¹⁶

Counterinsurgency is irregular warfare. It is defined as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.”¹¹⁷ Notwithstanding that tactics and means can cross over between traditional and irregular warfare, COIN, FID, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare are military operations primarily conducted in irregular warfare.¹¹⁸

Importantly, stability operations and BPC can occur anywhere on the spectrum of conflict, but the circumstances of the operating environment largely determine the objectives, the concepts for achieving the objectives, the authorities that apply and the mechanisms. Three terms are used to describe much of what DOD does in BPC, and security sector reform (SSR) in particular: security cooperation (SC), security assistance (SA), and security force assistance (SFA). In accordance with interagency agreements, SSR is also defined by DOD doctrine as “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.”¹¹⁹

Within DOD, security cooperation is the overarching term. Joint doctrine defines SC as “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”¹²⁰ Security cooperation activities (See Figures 11 and 12) are generally guided by Title 10 and Title 22 legislation. A security cooperation activity is “military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a CCDR’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan.”¹²¹ Many, but not all, are executed by the security cooperation organization (SCO), which is “all Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance/

cooperation management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions.” The SCO is the focal point for security cooperation in a country.¹²²

Security assistance is a “group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services

Title 10 Security Cooperation Program Examples of BPC

- Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
- Warsaw Initiative Fund
- Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
- Ministry of Defense Advisors
- Defense Institution Reform Initiative
- Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
- National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program
- Traditional Combatant Commander Activities
- Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
- Joint Combined Exchange Training

Figure 11. Title 10 Security Cooperation Examples¹²³

by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.”¹²⁴ It includes 12 major programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. Seven of these programs are managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

**Title 22, Security Assistance Program
Examples of BPC**

- Foreign military financing
- Foreign military sales
- International military education and training
- Peacekeeping operations
- Excess defense articles
- Presidential drawdowns

Figure 12. Title Security Assistance Program Examples¹²⁵

Security assistance legal authority is founded in Title 22 (22 U.S.C), Foreign Relations and Inter-course. As a result, DOD and the SCO administer selected SA programs on behalf of the Ambassador even though DOD personnel are doing the work.¹²⁶

SFA is defined as “the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”¹²⁷ Security forces are the “duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state.”¹²⁸ SFA is a concept of operations sponsored by Department of Army and USSOCOM and refers specifically to the military instrument’s support to the larger concept of FID. SFA can be provided by both conventional and special operations forces and is a subset




Figure 13. Security Force Assistance Activities¹²⁹

of security cooperation with security assistance providing the tools to fund and enable SFA.¹³⁰ A way to view the relationships among these concepts is depicted in Figure 13.

In addition to the normal programs, specific overseas contingency operations funded programs that build partner capacity can be authorized: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund; Iraq Security Forces Fund; Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund; and Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund are examples.¹³¹

These mechanisms of BPC may be applied in assisting other states in any environment along the spectrum of states, sometimes all acting in unison, and at other times in subordinate roles or precluded. Their use and rela-




Figure 14. Nesting Relationships Among NA, FID, SC, SA, SFA, IW and COIN¹³²

tionship is defined by the strategic and operational environments and the legalities and other considerations, but Figure 14 illustrates conceptually the doctrinal nesting.

Thus, a patchwork of overlapping doctrine, terminology, and potentially confusing authorities exists.¹³³ Nation assistance (NA) implies building

capacity in all operational themes across the spectrums of conflict and states. It may be preferable to state-building, but infers the same in regard to BPC. FID is applicable to all the efforts to support a host state in IW, but not in peace. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations captures and attempts to clarify the confusion by concluding:

- NA is whole of government and/or military assistance within a host nation's territory.
- IW is a violent struggle and does not occur in a stable environment.
- FID is a whole of government effort to support another government in IW.
- SC involves DOD interaction with foreign defense establishments and includes all U.S. military activities in FID.
- SC and FID cannot occur without a host nation/coalition-civilian governing authority.
- SA programs are funded by DOS and administered by DOD/DCSA.
- FID indirect support, FID direct support, and FID combat operations may occur simultaneously.
- FID indirect support can incorporate elements of SFA and SA.
- FID direct support can incorporate elements of SFA, but not SA.
- FID combat operations cannot incorporate SA or SFA.
- SA can incorporate SFA, but not all SFA is SA.
- SFA can include some FID indirect support and some FID direct support, but not FID combat operations.
- COIN can be part FID indirect support, direct support and/or combat operations, but not all are part of COIN.
- COIN can occur outside of FID when the insurgency is against a military governing authority.¹³⁴

At times, the legislation and guidance, and the doctrine and its terminology seem to create unnecessary confusion around BPC as different people at policy and the joint and service levels present varying perspectives. However, the larger strategic concept of BPC binds all these various components and perspectives together toward the larger objective of the grand strategy—a secure and positively competing world order. Authorities and environments will better define the legalities and the most appropriate doctrine. With strategic understanding of the strategic and operational environments and an appreciation of the reasons for partnering, professional competence is all

the military practitioner needs to discern a way forward. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the boundaries and good legal advice are needed companions. Yet, in a changing global environment, the military must also push existing boundaries to advocate modifications to boundaries and develop new methods as appropriate.

Services and USSOCOM/SOF Perspectives

Not surprisingly, for the military forces and USSOCOM, warfighting remains the fundamental responsibility. However, all of the services and USSOCOM participate in security cooperation and subscribe to the strategic concept of BPC with its whole of government and comprehensive approaches. All acknowledge, in some manner, a spectrum of states and the spectrum of conflict. However, the requirements posed by the Defense Strategy, the responsibilities inherent to their capacity, and the approaches differ among them. BPC is a joint endeavor within the military, but the roles and perspectives logically differ based on distinct forces and cultures. This section attempts to clarify these perspectives and their importance in regard to a SOF strategic perspective. Understanding these different cultural perspectives is important in any BPC strategy formulation, planning, and execution.

As earlier noted, DOD and joint strategy and planning processes incorporate and document security cooperation and BPC guidance in the defense strategy, national military strategy, guidance for employment of the force, and other planning and programming guidance for the combatant commands and the services. The CCDRs and service chiefs execute this guidance through their development of strategy and planning, but also inform DOD and joint processes from below. DOD, the Joint Staff, and the services have designated agencies, organizations, staff, and individual positions allocated to or in support of specific security cooperation activities at various levels within their organizational structures. Both uniformed personnel and DOD/service civilian personnel serve in these capacities. Most notable at DOD is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which has management responsibilities for many DOD international programs. However, numerous programs are managed by other Office of the Secretary of Defense agencies, the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), and the military departments. Other members of the interagency also contribute to security cooperation and familiarity with this larger community is essential for many

aspects of BPC.¹³⁵ However, the focus here is on understanding the service and USSOCOM perspectives on BPC.

Army. The U.S. Army has been at war for the past 12 years and, with the departure from Iraq and drawn-down in Afghanistan, is in the process of redirecting itself to better support the 2012 Defense Guidance. In October 2013, the chief of staff of the Army issued his strategic priorities, which included in the way ahead a major element titled “A Regionally Engaged Army” that would provide deployable and scalable regionally focused Army forces task organized for direct support of geographic and functional combatant commands and joint requirements.¹³⁶

The U.S. Army has a rich history in capacity building. Its role in civil as well as military affairs as the United States spread across the North American continent is a crucial theme in the history of building U.S. national capacity. Later overseas deployments, particularly in the aftermath of the war with Spain, World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam, resulted in the Army serving as a principal actor in building broad partner capacity across all sectors of state power. The U.S. Army’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan forced a reexamination of COIN warfare and how it must conduct operations in the 21st century. While the COIN manual received the most public attention, the concept of full spectrum operations was perhaps the greater doctrinal insight for the 21st century environment. It recognized the need in the 21st century for the Army to conduct a simultaneous and continuous mix of offense, defense, and stability operations across the spectrum of peace and conflict. Significantly, in accepting this it institutionalized BPC into Army operations in peace and war and led to unified land operations as the current Army operational doctrine.

Within the Army framework, military stability operations are integrated with whole of government and comprehensive efforts. Army doctrine identifies five broad conditions as the desired end state of successful stability tasks: a safe and secure environment; established rule of law; social well-being; stable governance; and a sustainable economy. These conditions are broad enough to guide BPC activities across the range of military operations, and their pursuit is supported by the principles and doctrine found in military and other literature. Stability operations may include expedient operations and activities as necessary, but the end state conditions always bring the focus back to building positive partner capacity.¹³⁷

Army BPC concepts identify primary and supporting roles for Army forces. The Army's primary role is focused on co-developing partner's security capacity at the tactical, institutional, and ministerial levels. By addressing the three levels, the Army seeks to build: "partners' individual and unit proficiency in security operations, institutional capacity for training, professional education, force generation and sustainment, and security sector programs that professionalize and strengthen capacity to synchronize and sustain security operations."¹³⁸ In its supporting role in BPC, the Army integrates "the capabilities of its operating, generating, and special operations forces to support efforts led by other U.S. Government agencies to enhance partners' ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, humanitarian relief, disaster response, and other critical government functions."¹³⁹ The Army recognizes the support role is often made more difficult by "...complex and competing authorities, legal challenges, expectations for rapid response, and limited preparation and training."¹⁴⁰

The Army considers its operating, generating, and special operations forces as integral to BPC. Like the other services, it has various specific organizations and individuals dedicated to security cooperation management and activities, but has designed into its line staffs and brigade combat teams structure to support stability operations and BPC. The Army's land force perspective is best expressed in the axiom heard from Soldiers on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan who found themselves involved in a wide range of activities beyond warfighting, "If you are there, you own it."¹⁴¹ This stoicism is endorsed by international law and the humanitarian concerns of citizens of the United States and elsewhere around the globe. Army perspectives and doctrine on BPC, often in collaboration with the Marine Corps and other national militaries, is most fully developed.

Navy. Any discussion of a Navy perspective of BPC must be qualified by noting that the Navy thinks in terms of maritime power, which includes the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard as sea services. Having noted this, there is a distinct Navy cultural perspective; one that relegates the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps to their particular realms and allows them to find their own path therein subordinate to the maritime strategy. The Chief of Naval Operations in his official blog under a leader of "Sharpening Our Maritime Strategy" states, in regard to an ongoing revision of strategy: "Emphasize warfighting as the primary mission of the sea services, while

maintaining and promoting an international cooperative approach to maritime security.”¹⁴² The ongoing revision will likely retain the fundamentals of *Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy*¹⁴³ that implemented the previous 2007 strategy and are articulated in the current Navy mission:

Deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, win our Nation’s wars. Employ the global reach and persistent presence of forward-stationed and rotational forces to secure the Nation from direct attack, assure joint operational access and retain global freedom of action. With global partners, protect the maritime freedom that is the basis for global prosperity. Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of allies and international partners to enhance global security.¹⁴⁴

Naval forces have a long history of cooperative action, port call exchanges, and shared sea challenges—in peace and war—with other nations. As a sea force, the Navy represents a familiar and acceptable footprint for capacity building activities.¹⁴⁵ The Navy argues it blends hard and soft power in building partner capacity: “Persistently postured forward, naval forces are continuously engaged with global partners in cooperative security activities aimed at reducing instability and providing another arm of national diplomacy.”¹⁴⁶ As a forward deployed force constantly conducting maritime security operations in the global commons, a first tier of capacity building for the Navy is collaboratively integrating operations and training with other nations to build interoperability and share the burden of global maritime security.¹⁴⁷ In addition to real world missions, the Navy conducts more than 150 exercises annually in the Asia-Pacific alone and even China will soon participate.¹⁴⁸ These prevention activities “build capable partners and address the causes of instability and conflict.”¹⁴⁹ From a Navy perspective, these collaborative engagements are the foundation of BPC, inculcating trust and cooperation, building competency and confidence, and yielding a greater shared capacity.

As a second tier for BPC, the Navy emphasizes its conduct and support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HA/DR). Such operations are more prevalent with the increasing development and growing populations in the littorals, creating greater potential for catastrophic natural and man-made disasters. Beyond crises, proactive humanitarian assistance is increasingly being used by GCCs as ways to promote safety,

security, and stability. As these activities are usually conducted in concert with others, they offer the opportunity to build capacity in partner forces and NGOs as well as within the U.S. interagency. In spite of concern over the potential effect on readiness, the Navy sees HA/DR as a core capability and a means by which to “enhance or restore critical host nation capacity, provide an opportunity to engage with a broader cross-section of the host nation’s population, and build relationships that serve to increase trust.”¹⁵⁰

The third tier in the Navy’s BPC is Maritime Security Force Assistance (MSFA). MSFA seeks to build capacity in foreign military and civilian maritime security forces, host government institutions, and multinational and regional maritime security organizations. In addition to assisting naval forces to better provide security for their populations, MSFA “promotes stability by developing partner nation capabilities to govern, control, and protect their harbors, inland and coastal waters, natural resources, commercial concerns, and national and regional maritime security interests.”¹⁵¹ The value of the Coast Guard’s expertise in its statutory missions is evident here. The Navy highlights the importance of the role of MSFA as:

MSFA initiatives foster trust and interoperability with allies and enduring partners, increase capabilities and capacities to address conventional and irregular threats, reduce the ungoverned areas within the maritime domain, promote regional stability, and set conditions that dissuade disruptive acts through cooperative actions. Expeditionary operations, enduring partnership missions, as well as bilateral and multi-lateral exercises involving nearly every Naval Service capability comprise the most common MSFA initiatives.¹⁵²

Like the other services, the Navy has specific structures and organizations dedicated to MSFA. As a reporting unit to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, the Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO) is responsible for the International Security Assistance programs, Cooperative Development programs, and Technology Security policy. The Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training (MCAST) Command provides teams of sailors trained and prepared to work collaboratively with military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations and the civilian populace across the spectrum of operations in the maritime environment. MCAST Command conducts civilian-to-military operations and military-to-military training to support security cooperation

and security force assistance requirements. It builds capacity directly by fielding individuals and regionally aligned teams in support of Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Force Assistance. The command consists of 299 personnel of which 127 are in the reserve.¹⁵³

The Navy has long appreciated capacity building in building partner naval capabilities and traditional maritime security. The broader appreciation of what maritime security is in the 21st century and the implications for the Navy's role and focus in the strategic concept of capacity building is an important cultural shift. The Navy is appropriately the critical component in U.S. capacity building in the maritime sphere. Its cultural perspective of an operational focus makes sense in this environment, as does its incorporation of U.S. Coast Guard capabilities into rising littoral concerns.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps vision of its role in the 21st century is succinctly articulated in the "Commandant's Planning Guidance":

The Marine Corps is America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness—a balanced air-ground-logistics team. We are forward-deployed and forward-engaged: shaping, training, deterring, and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies. We create options and decision space for our Nation's leaders. Alert and ready, we respond to today's crisis, with today's force ... TODAY. Responsive and scalable, we team with other services, allies and interagency partners. We enable and participate in joint and combined operations of any magnitude. A middleweight force, we are light enough to get there quickly, but heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and capable of operating independent of local infrastructure. We operate throughout the spectrum of threats—irregular, hybrid, conventional—or the shady areas where they overlap. Marines are ready to respond whenever the Nation calls ... wherever the President may direct.¹⁵⁴

The "Planning Guidance" foresees a world of increasing instability and conflict, where the Corps remains an expeditionary force that are forward deployed in areas of instability and potential conflict requiring Marines "... who are not only fighters, but also trainers, mentors and advisors."¹⁵⁵ Engagement is the operative term for BPC. Within the Corps, most forces:

When not actively engaged in combat operations or otherwise deterring a potential adversary, our forces routinely conduct rotational

deployments and other bilateral and multilateral training exercises with allied and partner nations. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of host nation forces, strengthen alliance cohesion and increase U.S. influence. These missions are all about trust. Building partners and allies has to be done in person...relationships matter.¹⁵⁶

Marines see themselves as the security partner of choice because they are sea based and present a smaller footprint in the host nation. In addition, they argue they are sized more closely to the smaller security forces of most nations and are an appropriate model for a tightly integrated air-ground-logistics force. These strengths make them suitable to train effective security institutions.¹⁵⁷ Modernization within the Corps includes the restructuring of the force to optimize forward presence, engagement, and crisis response. However, crisis response remains its primary motivation.¹⁵⁸

A good source of the Marine Corps BPC perspective is found in “Forward Deployed and Forward Engaged: The Marine Corps Approach to 21st Century Security Cooperation”, reflecting both the Commandants’ Planning Guidance and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.¹⁵⁹ It provides an overview of the Marine Corps approach and programs, the processes and training, and the organizations and roles. Focused on forward-deployed and forward-engaged, the Marines believe sustained cooperation builds capacity and produces favorable outcomes for U.S. interest:

We are shaping through engagement activities that seek to improve the capacity of partner governments and their security forces, preventing situations from degrading to a point where they threaten our national interests. We are training with our partners to increase interoperability in order to be better prepared to deal with crises. We are deterring through a persistent naval presence that is amplified by coordination with allies. Finally, we are prepared for responding to crises or contingencies by advising or operating alongside our coalition brethren.¹⁶⁰

Through engagement they seek to create partnerships, promote diplomatic access, provide reassurance, build partner capacity, reduce sources of friction within a region, and deter aggression. The document argues security cooperation is more than just exercises when otherwise not challenged; its

activities are mainstream Marine Corps operations that require a high level of leadership and focused preparation and training.¹⁶¹ Engagement will be approached through the process of regionalization that enables individual Marines and specific units to build cultural and operational expertise and relationships and trust in the region.¹⁶²

Marine Corps strategic guidance and planning and doctrine show a sophisticated understanding of the security challenges of the 21st century, the importance of BPC as a grand strategic concept, and how the Corps can contribute to its implementation. They make an important contribution; however, that contribution is constrained by the size of the Corps, the resources available, and the demands of crisis response.

Air Force. The U.S. Air Force approach to BPC is articulated in *2011 US Air Force Global Partnership Strategy*.¹⁶³ Like the Navy, the Air Force falls largely under the rubric of security cooperation and flow from Air Force core functions. Hence, it seeks to build or sustain a partner's capacity and capabilities in the air, space, and cyberspace domains. The term air domain is inclusive: "Air domain capabilities cover the entire spectrum of the aviation enterprise (defined as the sum total of all air domain resources, processes, and cultures) to include personnel, equipment, infrastructure, operations, sustainment, and air-mindedness."¹⁶⁴ Capacity building in the assisted nation's aviation enterprise is tailored to the needs of the host nation and its ability to absorb. For example, a basic aviation enterprise infrastructure may be more important than the latest technology. Focusing on its core functions, the Air Force capacity-building efforts contribute to the national BPC concept through building mutually beneficial international partnerships, enhancing partners' capacity and capabilities, and developing interoperability. As a result, partners are available to deter and defeat aggression, and strengthen international and regional security and stability.¹⁶⁵

Partner capacity is built through a litany of means: education and training; through global force posturing that allows operational forces to train and work with partners; specially trained and assigned U.S. security cooperation personnel; personnel exchanges; exercises; equipping activities; technology transfer and disclosure; information sharing; cooperative relationships and agreements; partner air force engagements; and humanitarian initiatives. Through such activities, the Air Force builds capabilities and capacity, which includes positive relations and trust that can enhance the overall capacity for

global security and stability. Capacity building is managed largely through Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force Secretary for International Affairs and Air Force with leadership and support provided by the operational units and security cooperation organizations and personnel.¹⁶⁶

USSOCOM. USSOCOM is a unified combatant command, but exercises some responsibilities that are service, military department, and defense agency-like. Among these are organize, train, and equip forces; prepare SOF strategy in support of Defense Strategic Guidance; and provide combat ready forces. USSOCOM members often refer to themselves as the only joint service that SOF forces are drawn from and still remain part of their respective services' structures. SOF forces within USSOCOM perform diverse missions and use direct and indirect approaches.

Elements of the SOF community have advocated a higher priority for either the direct or indirect approach, although the approaches are more mutually supportive and complementary than many advocates allow. The immediate threats of the early war on terrorism focused SOF on the direct action missions, but indirect approach advocates, particularly at the Army's Special Warfare Center, argued that future success and stability were more dependent on indirect approaches, and the needed expertise and capacity were being diverted toward immediate tactical aims and lost over time through lack of training and experience.¹⁶⁷ The debate has been rebalanced in favor of indirect approaches in recent years in strategic documents such as USSOCOM's *Special Operations Forces Operating Concept*.¹⁶⁸ The renewed emphasis on the indirect approach positions USSOCOM to play crucial roles in the emerging BPC strategy. It has led to the reexamination of the operating concept, reconsideration of doctrine, and the pursuit of a number of new initiatives at the time of this research to posture SOF to better serve in the new environment. While the latter are somewhat contentious and subject to change and policy approval, they reflect greater strategic understanding of the security challenges and grand strategy.

Like the other services' assessments, USSOCOM's *Operating Concept* examines the future operating environment. It concludes it is one in which direct and indirect action remain valid, but a more complex environment in which SOF function as part of "a globally linked force of SOF and their strategic partners—joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational,

nongovernmental, commercial, and academic [the Global SOF Network].”¹⁶⁹
In this environment:

SOF conduct core activities with a focused, balanced approach through small-footprint distributed operations to understand and influence relevant populations. USSOCOM optimizes and exploits the Global SOF Network to provide strategic options for National Leadership in support of U.S. Government efforts to enhance stability, prevent conflicts, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries.¹⁷⁰

The vision for a Global SOF Network is “a globally networked force of SOF, interagency, allies, and partners able to rapidly respond and persistently address regional contingencies and threats to stability.”¹⁷¹ The vision builds on what currently exists and works and builds toward the future capacity needed. USSOCOM is taking specific actions to increase SOF capacity within the GCCs through permanent assignment or rotations of units and strengthening the theater special operations commands (TSOCs). TSOCs are the primary theater SOF organization and provide the GCC the mechanism to exercise command and control. When the vision is fully realized, the TSOCs will serve as the hubs of the SOF Network in the GCCs. The vision also increases the number of special operations commands forward (SOCFWD). Located in the area of responsibility, SOCFWDs are command nodes for forward deployed tactical units. They are an extension of the TSOC. They provide a SOF voice and influence to joint task forces and chief of mission activities, but equally important are a mechanism to improve SOF relationships with other interagency partners and allies as part of the foundation of the network. The vision also builds on the partnership successes of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) created in 2007. NSHQ was instrumental in gaining and managing partner special operations support in Afghanistan. Increasing the number of special operations liaison officers (SOLOs) is also part of the vision. SOLOs serve as USSOCOM representatives and SOF advisors within selected U.S. embassies. Their value lies in the opportunities to build relationships and synchronize activities with the host nation SOF and other defense forces, as well as work collaboratively with the interagency actors within the U.S. embassies.¹⁷²

The SOF Network initiative is a strategic concept that gives USSOCOM an enhanced global perspective and situational awareness to better support

the GCCs and chiefs of missions, interagency partners, and international partners. The envisioned future operating environment will still require direct action missions and other combat roles, but building partnerships and partnership capacity are recognized as the crux of future stability and security and the achievement of U.S. interests.¹⁷³ Other constructs are needed to successfully implement the vision. Authorities and logistics constructs are obvious needs, but not developed here.¹⁷⁴

The GMSC is figuratively the heart, brain, and nervous system of the Network. In simple terms, its purpose is to monitor and use information generated anywhere within the Network to maintain a global common operating picture, enhance operations, and sustain the network.

While the Network obviously focuses on successful SOF operations in support of the CCDRs, the inherent potential for it as a whole to be an integral and strategic part of the emerging grand strategy leading to a favorable world order and the right security partners to sustain it is obvious. USSOCOM strategy documents clearly link successful states, partnership, and capacity building to strategic success well beyond simple budget and national debt considerations. Hence, the SOF Network is an appropriate strategic application of SOF power in support of national security.¹⁷⁵

The *Operating Concept* is an unconstrained view of how SOF will operate in the future. Both the USSOCOM strategy, *USSOCOM 2020*, and its *Operating Concept* grasp and incorporate a critical aspect of building and sustaining a positively competing environment: “Success in the future demands unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, and understanding—conditions that can’t be surged.”¹⁷⁶ The key tenets of the *Operating Concept* reflect an understanding of the strategic environment confronting the United States and many of the key premises and principles for pursuing partnerships and building partner capacity in the 21st century. While doctrinal activities may change in detail over time, these tenets are applicable to today’s core SOF activities and any future ones that may be assigned:

- Networking to build and sustain enduring relationships and partnerships.
- Culturally-astute and linguistically-educated SOF operators who operate in the human domain to understand and influence relevant populations.
- Understanding and influencing narratives.

- Deliberate theater-level operations linking engagement activities and operational missions in time, space, and purpose.
- Enduring versus episodic engagement (multi-year, same region).
- Small-footprint distributed operations by fully enabled SOF teams with no degradation of capabilities or support, regardless of location.
- Reduced-signature operations (The Invisible Operator).
- Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence for a worldwide network.
- Elevating SOF non-lethal skills to the same level of expertise as lethal skills.¹⁷⁷

USSOCOM as a proponent for irregular warfare recognizes that meaningful BPC requires enhancing a local partner's legitimacy and influence over a population by building the partner's ability to provide security, good governance, and economic development while addressing issues of conflict.¹⁷⁸ SOF's activities are all inherently enhanced by comprehensive approaches and facilitated by relationships that have been forged before crisis. Thus, the key tenets of the *Operating Concept* reinforce the conception of the SOF operator as a warrior-diplomat.¹⁷⁹

SOF BPC activities may originate from DOD, the GCCs, USSOCOM, at the request of other members of the U.S. interagency organization, or from international partners. However, SOF BPC activities outside the United States are not conducted in an area without the appropriate approval of the President, Secretary of Defense, the GCCs, and Chiefs of Missions. USSOCOM, with a couple of unique exceptions, is a supporting commander.¹⁸⁰ SOF organizational doctrine provides SOF structure and command and control for various conditions of employment.¹⁸¹

All SOF from the services participate doctrinally and practically in capacity building through security cooperation and other activities. USSOCOM states that on an average day, SOF partnership activities are ongoing in 78 countries.¹⁸² Generally, SOF from all branches of service address BPC in building partner SOF and service capability based on their service or SOF expertise. However, this is not always the case and SOF resources have been used in various roles in host nation capacity building that range across services, within the larger defense sector, and more broadly within civilian society.

SOF doctrine is growing into the new security environment and to support the strategic imperatives for a positively competing environment. The

changes are illustrated best in the Army SOF doctrine. Army SOF capabilities consist of special warfare and surgical strike, reflecting indirect and direct approaches. Special warfare is:

The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.¹⁸³

Surgical strike is:

The execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats.¹⁸⁴

Some units may have greater or less capabilities to practice one or the other, or both. However, the doctrine correctly focuses all Army SOF on the same imperatives and regional mechanisms, both reflecting sophistication in the new thinking required for the 21st century environment.

Both the Army SOF imperatives and mechanisms reflect what SOF has known in the past, but the past knowledge has been updated to deal with the new challenges of the present and future. How well this doctrine is understood, embraced, updated, and serves strategic purpose remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the SOF community's perspectives are well-focused on the emerging security paradigm and the mechanisms and imperatives reveal what strengths in understanding and capacity SOF brings to the table.

BPC is a complex undertaking as a result of the VUCA in the strategic environment, the legalities, authorities, responsibilities, and legitimacy issues, the muddle of the BPC matrix, and the differences in cultural perspectives. However, all seem to have embraced, in some form, the value of BPC and its mechanisms and this is reflected in their guidance for the future and emerging doctrine. The services rightfully play to their strengths and USSOCOM is defining a key and appropriate role for SOF. It remains to be seen how much each adheres to its BPC commitment, but the unanimity of support is encouraging.

7. Perspectives for Special Operations Strategy and Planning

To combat this widespread and evolving threat, we have engaged with willing nations around the world, building their capabilities and strengthening our partnerships with them. We have leveraged a whole-of-government approach, characterized by diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, informational, financial, and military instruments. In doing so ... we have protected the American people.¹⁸⁵ – Michael A. Sheehan and Derek H. Chollet, joint statement, April 9, 2013

The challenges posed by the 21st century environment for the United States are momentous, and not only because the threats, potential threats, and risks are staggering. The competing demands on the nation's resources to build internal strength and national prosperity and still provide a military force to meet traditional and new security needs require new approaches. Looking forward, successful partnering and a base of strategic partnerships are the focal points of an emerging U.S. grand strategy, and effective BPC is a lynchpin in achieving them.

SOF represent a unique and critical national level BPC capacity and potentially play a pivotal role in formulating the details of the strategy. As in the past, SOF will be at the tip of the spear in execution, but SOF may also be critical to aiming the spear. SOF personnel, organizations, and operating methods are uniquely well-suited for the most problematic aspects of the emerging security issues. How should SOF think about its role in and relationships within BPC and the use of its unique capabilities? USSOCOM has recognized the challenges and taken significant steps with revised strategy guidance and doctrine, the Global SOF Network concept, building interagency capacity with SOF personnel placed in other key agency offices and in selected embassies, changes in professional development and force management, and reemphasizing BPC related roles and competencies.¹⁸⁶ However, there are other considerations and implications that must be taken into account. This chapter outlines some of these considerations for strategists, planners, and decision-makers in regard to preparing and using SOF.

Build SOF Strategic Understanding

Earlier in this monograph the British construct of “understanding” was introduced to illustrate the nature and level of thinking competencies demanded in the context of a 21st century environment. This is summarized as:

Understanding
 Situational awareness + analysis = Comprehension (Insight)
 Comprehension + judgment = Understanding (Foresight)¹⁸⁷

SOF theory, culture, doctrine, and practice already embraced much of what contributes to “understanding.” SOF personnel have dealt with and continue to deal with the VUCA resulting from the clash of change and continuities around the globe. SOF personnel show an exceptional appreciation for tactical context and situational awareness. SOF culture champions creativity, adaptability, flexibility, and competency—essential attributes in BPC planning and execution. SOF also embrace cross-cultural competency and relationship building and trust as core premises. Even “understanding” is advocated as a principle of evolving special operations.¹⁸⁸ However, understanding as advocated here is at the level of statecraft—that is the ability to achieve insight at the strategic level and have the foresight to be able to apply judgment in the policy, strategy, and planning processes, or in the tactical execution in a manner that engenders favorable strategic outcomes.

Obviously SOF officers, warrant officers, or noncommissioned officers are not policymakers, and most will never be strategists per se. However, many may be called on to offer advice to policymakers and senior leaders or assist in strategy formulation and planning. Almost all will be in positions to observe unfolding conditions and contribute insights to the intelligence, strategy, and planning processes. Most will contribute in some way or participate in the execution of the strategic concept of BPC. All should understand the importance of BPC and its contribution, and the nature of that contribution, to U.S. grand strategy. Each should be able to answer key BPC questions such as posited below in order to better integrate their specific roles and activities into the broader U.S. strategy, or adapt as necessary to changing context without losing strategic momentum. All must have a level of understanding so as to see any disconnects or issues between the U.S. strategy and actual, emerging, and potential context within the strategic and

operational environments and the ability to effectively communicate their insights and concerns upward. Many will have to create specific answers to issues at their specific level of responsibility; others need only to be able to fathom what is offered from higher levels, foresee their implications, and put them into action appropriately. All must be able to prioritize in the face of competing demands. SOF special expertise and perspectives must be represented at the highest levels of military and policy consideration in order to make the best use of SOF power. While such a SOF “understanding competency” is not BPC specific, its distinctness from tactical understanding can be illustrated by the ability to answer these key questions in considering BPC for a particular state or territory.

Key BPC Questions

- What are or should be the specific U.S. interests and objectives in the particular region, state, or territory in regard to security?
- What are or should be all the other U.S. interests involved—in the state or territory, in the region, and globally?
- What are the stated and potential interests of the host state, host actors, or other indigenous actors within the state or territory?
- What are the stated and potential interests of U.S. allies and partners?
- What other regional and global states and actors have stated or potential interests involved and what are they?
- How do all these interests interact? Complement or conflict? Who are potential supporters or distractors?
- What are the strategic factors that affect—contribute to or detract from—the various interests? That is, what is the political, military, economic, social, and cultural context? What objectives and probable courses of action by the United States and other actors are suggested by consideration of these factors?¹⁸⁹
- How might U.S. and others’ interests change over time? Why and what are the potential effects of the change?
- How might the strategic factors change? How would such change affect U.S. and others’ interests and probable courses of action?
- What are or should be the long-term strategic objectives of the United States? What are or should be the short-term strategic objectives? What are the likely long- and short-term strategic objectives of the

host state or actors? What are the likely long- and short-term strategic objectives of other regional and global state and non-state actors? What is the congruency of all these interests and objectives? What are or should be the specific U.S. interests and objectives to be pursued? Who shares these or compatible interests? Is there a potential for an enduring strategic partnership? With whom? What other partnering opportunities exist? Should the U.S. pursue partnering and a BPC strategy?

- What level of partnering with a host nation or actors and others is appropriate to best serve U.S. interests? What level and type of capacity building best advances U.S. partnering and interests? What level and type best advances the partners' interests, both partner stated and U.S. inferred? How can these best be integrated? What are the potential outcomes—good and bad—of partnering?
- What are the specific ends, ways, and means of a U.S. BPC strategy or the BPC aspects of a larger U.S. strategy? How do the military BPC strategy and plans integrate with other U.S. interagency and comprehensive efforts?
- What are the measures of success, need for change, or failure?
- How is context changing at the tactical, operational, strategic levels? Is it favorable or unfavorable? What are the implications for policy, strategy, planning, and action? Is the inherent adaptability and flexibility of the strategy and planning sufficient for changes or is a new policy, strategy, or planning required?
- What are the proper roles of SOF power, and what objectives and concepts make best use of SOF?

Such “strategic understanding,” referred to elsewhere as strategic thinking and strategic appreciation competencies, are acquired through education and professional development experience. USSOCOM recognizes the need to improve strategic understanding in the force and is seeking to place selected officers in graduate education programs that engender this level of thinking. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) has recently created the Summit Course for selected senior enlisted leaders to promote strategic level competencies. JSOU also incorporates a degree of strategic appreciation in other courses. In addition, many SOF officers and noncommissioned officers attend the professional development schools of their services, which may offer such

education. However, the future requires such strategic understanding and appreciation across SOF, and there is a need for SOF specific “understanding” that should be addressed with in-house capabilities. In regard to the latter, it is imperative to educate others on SOF power and its proper application. Enhancing such strategic understanding across the force improves SOF performance in any role in the VUCA of the 21st century environment.

Differentiate Among Relationships and Partnerships

Appreciation of the human domain and the importance of personal and organizational relationships are key aspects of U.S. special operations theory, doctrine, and practice.¹⁹⁰ They will remain essential elements of SOF competencies, becoming even more critical in the future. USSOCOM expresses the end game of mastering the human domain and relationships in the introduction to the *Special Operations Forces Operating Concept*:

You Can't Surge Trust. You must build it, slowly and deliberately, before a crisis occurs. Imagine 2020, a time when joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, commercial, and academic partners cooperate, trust each other, and combine their capabilities and authorities to provide National Leadership with innovative strategic options. Imagine interdependent armed forces being structured to implement national security and defense strategies, versus strategies constrained by suboptimized force structure. Times such as these can originate only from unprecedented levels of mutual trust, confidence, and understanding that recognize no fixed boundaries and foster networking and collaboration.¹⁹¹

Personal relationships are extremely important in working specific issues at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Among states, individual personal relationships and trust matter, but long-term strategic relations and trust are founded in mutually shared or supporting values and interests. As compatible values, interests, relationships, and trust grow, an enduring strategic partnership may evolve. Such a strategic partnership is well-enough developed that it can be counted on for support or survive even when personal relations are strained and national interests vary in importance.

An environment where these latter conditions are the norm within and among all states and other actors would provide an optimum basis for

security in a positively competing world order. However, the history of state politics and human nature suggest that such a universal utopia is unlikely to exist. Nonetheless, in the search for security and stability in favorable conditions, it is possible, and even probable if properly pursued, that sufficient states and actors can be brought together in alliances and coalitions that swing sufficient balance of power to sustain a favorable world order. Trust and enabling mechanisms, such as the SOF Network, are essential to achieving, sustaining, and leveraging this balance favorably. However, human nature and the realities of state politics as well as vagaries of context argue that all who would constitute this balance will not be alike in interests, capabilities, immediacy of concern, or commitment. In face of these realities, the distinctions between expedient cooperation, partnering, and strategic partnership with and among states and non-state actors become extremely important to where, with whom, and how the United States should pursue BPC in a constrained resource environment.

In this regard, state relationships can be viewed as existing on a continuum: (1) existing strategic partners, (2) identified potential strategic partners, (3) cooperating or expedient partnering, (4) normalized relationships or neutrals, (5) potential adversaries, and (6) identified adversaries. In truth, building relationships and trust with any of these states is important, and the U.S. instruments of power and tools of capacity building can help accomplish this, ranging from maintaining relationships and interoperability with existing strategic partners to trust-building exercises with adversarial states. However, at the heart of any U.S. response to changing conditions must be a core of strategic partners who can be relied on to work toward a common good of a positively competing world order. Others may join the bandwagon and contribute effectively, but the relationship bonds may be less strong. Major issues of legitimacy, resources, and staying power will inevitably hinge on the support of enduring strategic partners.

Confronted with this reality, the United States must invest BPC efforts and resources wisely, recognizing the value of BPC in modernizing any cooperative state or building trust, but prudently focusing resources and efforts on those with the greatest potential value as U.S. global or regional strategic partners—in values, interests, and will to improve and act—and adhere to and sustain a partnering process with these states. Such partners must embrace the constructs of a modern state and a positively competing international environment and contribute substantively politically, economically,

militarily, and socio-psychologically to sustaining a favorable order. In the long run these partners enhance U.S. capacity exponentially, even as the partnership enhances theirs.

Many USSOCOM initiatives and practices, such as the Global SOF Network and security cooperation activities, play a significant role in building relationships and trust across the spectrum of actors and populations. SOF must discriminate prudently among these to build enduring strategic partnerships, without engendering any animosity in lesser relationship building. Adherence to the BPC Posits offered in Chapter 6 leads logically to an appropriate, understandable, and acceptable allocation of BPC efforts.

In addition, the combination of SOF's unique culture, global perspective, roles in the U.S. military, and relationships across the spectrum of domestic and international actors also qualify SOF to offer perceptive insights on where to pursue strategic true partnerships and how to apply BPC methods and assets. A higher level of strategic understanding in the force enhances this propensity.

Leverage a BPC Holistic Perspective

BPC represents an intervention into the strategic environment—the introduction of change into a global system of systems. Any change military or other BPC introduces potentially affects other aspects of host state governance, the larger society of the host state, other states, and internal and external non-state actors. In a similar manner, the success of any change introduced may be dependent on or interdependent with other circumstances or changes. Effective BPC requires a holistic perspective. Any military BPC must be nested in the larger aspects of strategic understanding and other BPC efforts, just as other forms of capacity building must logically be nested in security reform progress. However, gaining and sustaining a holistic BPC perspective is not easy. It is obviously rooted in strategic understanding and is guided by other frameworks and mindsets.

First, whole of government and comprehensive approaches are key frameworks. Their value in capacity building is emphasized throughout this monograph and well-documented in doctrine and other literature as a result of the international community's positive and negative experiences in Eastern Europe, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It is important to recognize that these approaches are justified as much by their ability to find

a “best answer” and preclude wrong or counterproductive actions by one state, agency, or organization as they are to eliminate duplication, wasted resources, and overwhelming of recipients. In BPC, SOF must continue to seek mastery of the interagency and comprehensive processes—relationships and trust matter in these processes also. However, the purpose and focus of the relationship building and participating in the processes must be on constructive ends that serve national interests by contributing to the achievement of objectives, offering more viable concepts, providing or conserving resources, mitigating risks, and integrating and de-conflicting efforts. SOF must continue to develop a whole of government and comprehensive mindset from the strategic to the tactical level that is informed by strategic purpose and understanding.

Second, there are principles as expressed earlier in this monograph and insights, lessons learned, and diagrams and lists in doctrine and other literature that help guide strategy and planning in regard to BPC. Many of the latter can be found in the references in this monograph’s endnotes. These are tools and frameworks that can be used to inform a holistic perspective and should be an integral part of the doctrinal and education processes.

Third, the legal, legitimacy, legislative intent, and policy frameworks must be approached with a holistic mindset that perceives them less as constraints and more as intent and possibilities, opportunities, and constructs within which, or outside of which with specific authority, initiative can operate. Such frameworks deny some courses and activities, but offer specific BPC alternatives and often allocate resources that go unused. In reality, they do not preclude much the informed mind can formulate given U.S. values, interests, and legitimacy concerns. Changes in authorities may be appropriate, but more important in BPC is to have the foresight to enter the frameworks appropriately in a timely manner.

Fourth, the interconnectedness of the global environment requires a holistic perspective, but all BPC undertakings are unique, and consequently any military, interagency, and comprehensive efforts must be designed to address the specific context of the operational environment at hand. It must be nested in the larger grand strategy, but it cannot be alien to its own context. Thus, as the United States learned at great costs, a Western style democracy may not be possible in the near term in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the context had been better understood or accepted, perhaps the BPC efforts could have been adjusted to save resources and lay the seeds for future

democratic progress in these states. Thus, any particular BPC strategy or plan should be the product of the informed and fertile mind in light of the strategic objectives, the situational context, and the art of the possible when considering the whole.

As the previous chapter stated, SOF is responsible for specific activities along the spectrum of conflict that relate to BPC, however, SOF's responsibilities and attributes inherently prepared them to contribute to a broader perspective—a more holistic one—in regard to BPC. This inherent capacity should be built upon and expanded and access to it provided to strategic forums.

Identify USSOCOM and SOF Roles

Significant potential aspects of BPC exist in all the recognized special operations activities, if the need exists to build mission supporting or sovereign capacity in those with whom SOF must or desire to partner. The use of BPC subordinate to any of these activities, while not universally appreciated within the whole of the SOF community and others, is well understood by the SOF community's internal indirect advocates. Doctrine and practice to serve the activities exists, but may be light on BPC particulars. However, BPC as a larger strategic concept begs the question of how SOF might be used writ large in regard to supporting a grand strategy. It requires a degree of counterintuitive thinking, from what is the role of BPC in a particular activity or mission to how any particular activity or mission can serve the grand strategic concept of building greater supportive global capacity for the positive competition order. In this section, a framework of broad SOF capabilities and potential partners is used to develop insights on employment.

USSOCOM as a BPC Proponent or Advocate. USSOCOM must ask itself what role it will assume in regard to BPC in the grand strategy. The command is already a joint proponent for security force assistance and co-proponent for irregular warfare. In its SFA role, USSOCOM advises the joint staff and policymakers on whom the United States should engage with in SFA, priorities among these efforts, and what combinations of U.S. forces should be used.¹⁹² It prepares and staffs doctrine and takes the lead for various issues. USSOCOM is in an excellent position to participate in shaping the understanding of BPC priorities and strategic application as a part of a U.S. grand strategy. The global perspective and the SOF activities and

culture create a synergy that engenders USSOCOM with a unique level of situational awareness and the potential for a level of strategic understanding unique within the military and most of the government bureaucracy. Such understanding is critical in decisions of whether to undertake or avoid BPC, and the nature of any efforts if undertaken.

In this regard, the Global SOF Network and GMSC are valuable mechanisms for developing an enhanced global perspective for advising, supporting, and acting in an informed manner. Lost in the debate over what USSOCOM's changes are about is the fact that the SOF Network is meant to function like other 21st century networks in which information flows more freely and is integrated in a manner that traditional stovepipe systems cannot do. In this regard, it does not compete with traditional systems as much as it bridges the gaps. Making such a network mechanism functional is a daunting task, but its value is readily apparent to those who understand how information and networking work in the 21st century environment. As a concept, it is merely building on and enhancing an information dynamic that has existed in the SOF community for decades as a result of an international credibility founded in professionalism, relationship building, and trust. The services and other agencies share a similar dynamic with their international communities, but SOF have transcended the normal boundaries. However, as previously argued, the present propensity must be further developed through education, organization, and processes. It should be vigorously pursued as essential to successful SOF activities and as a national contribution.

SOF to SOF. USSOCOM should retain the lead in BPC as it relates to special operations capacity. SOF BPC should be executed appropriately by the service components of SOF. Logically, U.S. maritime SOF would work with the partner's naval SOF capacity building; however, there are competencies and skills that might be taught by SOF, conventional forces, or others. SOF BPC initiatives that are comprehensive in nature, such as the SOF network or regional efforts such as NATO SOF, while supporting larger U.S. strategy require USSOCOM direction and support.

SOF to Indigenous Security Forces. USSOCOM and SOF roles in BPC in regard to the security forces of partnering states run the gamut of security cooperation from training individuals and units to institutional security sector reform. However, exactly where SOF efforts and resources are applied must be determined by the strategic and operational environments

and the need for the special attributes and capabilities of SOF. These latter may include the need for a high level of cross cultural competency; sensitive, covert or clandestine nature of U.S. involvement; urgency; partnering state preferences; capacity needs; or security context. Such needs will determine when and where SOF use is most appropriate.

SOF to U.S. Forces. In capacity building, as in conflict, SOF and conventional forces are complementary, integrative, and mutually supportive. Consequently, in much of BPC, SOF and conventional forces will be deployed in the same operational environments whether in war or peace. USSOCOM needs to address several questions about this shared BPC space. How can SOF better integrate SOF BPC initiatives with conventional activities? How can SOF leverage or provide leverage to conventional initiatives and activities? How can SOF expertise inform conventional force doctrine and training? What might USSOCOM do to build a better joint BPC capacity within the U.S. military?

SOF should closely examine what all the other services do as capacity building to identify approaches and techniques and where they can make use of other services activities through participation, integration, and non-duplication. Understanding service doctrines and capabilities allows SOF to build stronger service relationships, better integrate operations, use others' resources, and take a more comprehensive perspective. In short, USSOCOM must internalize leveraging SOF with conventional capabilities and learn how to think strategically about the use of conventional forces to maximize SOF's unique capabilities.¹⁹³

SOF in support of other agencies and organizations. BPC is inherently whole of government and comprehensive in nature. Logically SOF must build relationships and trust with the interagency, but more than this, SOF must share SOF expertise and garner that of agencies to better enable U.S. BPC efforts. Such a level of mutual cooperation can only be achieved through cross-assigning personnel and building confidence and practices over time. In addition, some agencies need and want a SOF presence in their in-country efforts. For example, some embassies require or accept SOF on their country teams or want SOF resources to support their initiatives on the ground. To a lesser degree, USSOCOM and SOF must build relationships and trust with nongovernmental organizations where it is advantageous. In this environment, SOF are more effective in serving a facilitating role, even

when pursuing distinct military objectives. The ongoing outreach initiatives discussed in Chapter 7 are appropriate mechanisms for addressing these needs and should go forward.

SOF in Unconventional Warfare. Some states may choose not to participate in a positively competing world order. When these states' choices and actions threaten their neighbors and regional stability, or their governance of their citizens become unacceptable, the United States and its partners may resort to the use of conventional military power. However, SOF unconventional warfare may be a better policy alternative. In unconventional warfare, BPC activities may be conducted with underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla forces; however, capacity building may also need to address to some degree civil society issues to be successful. Irregularity does not invalidate the need for a wide range of BPC. USSOCOM and SOF need to answer the question of what BPC strategy is necessary from the start to the end of unconventional warfare to create the greatest probability that, in winning the war, a successful state emerges. The answers must recognize that SOF may be the only U.S. asset in the country.

Adopt a Framework for SOF BPC Prioritization

As the *2012 Defense Strategic Guidance* states, resources and priorities are significant issues for the foreseeable future. The redirection to the Pacific Rim focuses conventional U.S. maritime and air power on rising powers in that theater. In this strategy, BPC and increased use of SOF compensate for the lack of resources for other challenges to security. Given the numerous instability challenges posed by the 21st century, SOF will likely be called upon to perform all its doctrinal missions as well as other types of military or paramilitary missions as directed. Since much of SOF can be tasked against multiple activities, a significant issue that SOF leadership must answer is for what and when, where, and how is SOF BPC capacity best used—how must SOF employment be prioritized against specific challenges or missions?

There are no explicit answers to these questions without specific context; however, there are ways to think about them. Individuals and staffs have methods of consideration, from elaborate rational models to intuition. However, any method must consider prudent questions to which the answers will shape the decision of whether the military element of power is appropriate and whether SOF is the best instrument of choice within the military. The

types of questions and considerations, and a process of consideration, are illustrated in Figure 15 and discussed in detail here.

What are the national interests at stake and their immediacy? If the interests are significant enough and the immediacy compelling, any and all the national instruments of power—political, economic, military, and socio-psychological—may be brought to bear. In fact, given the interconnectedness of the 21st century world, most interests are served directly or indirectly by multiple instruments. For example, coercive military force may be appropriate for vital interests, but it is invariably paired with diplomacy.

What is the nature of the opportunity or challenge presented? Response in regard to interests does not only imply threats. Leadership and their advisors must recognize the opportunities that may advance or protect interests as well as threats or other challenges to them. Often circumstances pose both challenges and opportunities. The nature of both the challenges and opportunities shape the decisions as to what instruments are best suited. What is the level and nature of the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity of the circumstances? In questions of acting in regard to interests, the levels of VUCA affect the selection of the instruments and further inform details of what must be done and where, how, and when to act. Certain government agencies and interagency groups are better suited and structured for differing aspects of VUCA, just as they are to the fundamental nature of the opportunity or challenge.

What are the risks in acting or not acting? Decisions and nondecisions in regard to the opportunities for and challenges to national interests represent strategic choices with real consequences for the nation's well-being and relative power within the international order. Risk is more than a consideration of the cost benefit analysis of alternative courses of action—although that is its essence; it is a distinct consideration of possible options and all the potential consequences. Hence, it considers the range of options from not responding to responding in differing ways and combinations of ways against the knowns and unknowns of the strategic and operational environments to judge the worthiness of each possible response. In the process, it provides opportunities to account for risk through reconsideration, mitigation, and contingencies. From this may flow a military option and even a preferable solution of SOF BPC. However, as SOF are an extraordinary and finite capability, other considerations remain.

Is there a requirement for SOF specific competencies? SOF as “the preferred choice” is part of the SOF community’s mantra. Yet, obviously, SOF as a limited strategic resource should not be misspent on missions or tasks for which others are suited. This question is a consideration of whether the undertaking requires the caliber of SOF talent for acceptable success within the parameters of risk. In an era of finite resources and multiple challenges, if others are sufficiently proficient to undertake a particular mission, they may represent the best option so SOF can be used elsewhere.

What is the availability of capabilities and resources? On one level, this consideration examines availability within the SOF structure. However, on another level it examines the availability of capabilities and resources in the rest of the joint force and among partners and other actors. Is the need for secrecy or plausible deniability a requirement? If so, who does this rule in or rule out? These are SOF attributes in the U.S. military structure that rightfully carry weight, but are there other options such as the civil sector or other actors? Is a U.S. footprint in the country or region problematic? Again, a small footprint is a SOF strength and argues for a SOF solution, if U.S. military presence is deemed essential.

How do temporal and conditional aspects affect SOF participation? Is SOF more appropriate for initial stages of BPC where little or no institutional structure exists? When and under what conditions might SOF hand off BPC to other U.S. agencies with parallel missions and capabilities? If these considerations lead to a preferred SOF solution, one more question remains. Given SOF is an extraordinary and finite resource, what is this BPC effort’s priority among all ongoing special operations efforts?

SOF are an extraordinary and finite capability and cannot be the hammer of choice for every perceived BPC nail. However, BPC is a strategic imperative that must be addressed, even as other demands arise, if the environment is to be shaped favorably. Utilization of SOF BPC capacity requires strategic prioritization, as does other SOF employment. As this author argued previously, “Special operations and SOF’s relative value increase as direct strategic utility is approached.”¹⁹⁴ Consequently, it deserves careful consideration on the part of decision-makers and those who advise them.

The prioritization framework for SOF reinforces the value of the competency of understanding within the SOF community in order to advise decision-makers properly on the strategic utility and prioritization of SOF. In prioritization, the question may now be not what can SOF do, but what can




Figure 15. Considerations for Use of SOF

only SOF do? This latter question reframes priorities. USSOCOM has also reinforced the importance of proactive measures in the security environment and must now carefully consider how to best apply SOF BPC capacity across the spectrum of peace and conflict.

Rethink Force Allocation to Support BPC

U.S. SOF operator resources are clearly insufficient for the demands of 21st century security. While the forces can be grown to some degree, SOF operator capacity will be challenged again and again and will remain short of the overall need. The force strength issue creates a strategic Catch-22 in force allocation for decision-makers: prioritization of SOF manpower in one mission area—functional or geographic—creates shortage issues elsewhere. The experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the greater global effort against terrorism illustrate this quandary and its consequences. Beyond the human tragedy of mental breakdowns and family breakups, training and readiness issues, inadequately addressed roles and missions—SOF gained combat and field experience, but overall SOF capacity was lost because indirect capabilities were applied to direct action needs. The conventional military suffered

similarly, but perhaps to a lesser aggregate degree as a result of more growth and the nature and related stress of tasks. *SOCOM 2020* recognizes and seeks to remedy this dilemma through its lines of operations.¹⁹⁵ This section suggests that greater understanding of the nature of the environments and the relationships among them in which SOF operator roles are essential might help in finding a proper balance for use of SOF operators. In the process it illuminates the pivotal role and importance of BPC.

There are many lexicons for describing the environments to which forces are allocated depending on focus and desired level of detail. Five broad setting descriptions serve to illustrate the nature and relationship of the draw on SOF manpower and the management challenge (See Figure 16).

War. The war environment is one in which the United States considers itself at war or in a significant conflict and is committing significant forces, both conventional and SOF. Such an environment, whether local, regional, or global, has the propensity to draw in all available SOF.

Crisis. The crisis environment is one short of war in terms of conflict, but often includes combat strikes and missions, as well as major peacekeeping and enforcement and humanitarian operations. SOF is a talented and readily available option for policymakers and will be increasingly called on as a preferred choice because of responsiveness, smallness of footprint, plausible deniability, and clandestine capabilities.

Contingencies. The contingencies environment recognizes that forces are often linked to contingency missions that limit to some degree their responsiveness and flexibility in regard to other uses. Contingencies shape training, preparation, availability, equipment and logistics, and response times that may be problematic. Contingency considerations often require forward deployment and regional orientation of SOF forces.

International Sustainment. The international sustainment environment acknowledges that requirements exist for SOF personnel in positions within U.S. embassies and other permanent or semi-permanent activities and relationships outside the United States. One example is U.S. SOF in NATO. The SOF Network and other forward-looking plans of USSOCOM will likely increase the manpower allocated in this manner.

CONUS Base. The CONUS base environment represents those SOF resources required in the continental United States to provide the institutional support for the deployed forces. These resources include the training and educational institutions and facilities of USSOCOM and the services, CONUS based headquarters and staffs, and the personnel assigned to them or to other staffs or agencies within CONUS. The CONUS base also represents the manpower positions that afford SOF personnel opportunities to home base in the United States and step out of the stress circumstances of deployments.

To some extent, resource shortfalls can be offset in part by multitasking organizations and people and innovative solutions, such as embedding training opportunities and mission requirements. Nonetheless, prioritization will always be necessary. However, recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan reveals the forces can only be stretched so far before stress faults begin to show in training issues and field competence, retention, unit readiness, and personal life. While in these cases war stressed the force, over-commitment is the real culprit. In any over-commitment, current requirements forfeit or eat away capacity and resiliency as hedges against future challenges. All four lines of operations identified in *SOCOM 2020* focus on meeting increasing requirements, finding sustainable balances, and building capacity and resiliency relative to individuals, organizations, and the force overall. All these lines of operation are important and necessary. However, what cannot be lost in prioritization is that the real solution to meeting the manpower challenges lies in the more rapid creation of the future desired global environment.

The future desired global environment has positively competing states and strategic partners that create and sustain a world order and conditions favorable to the United States. In this grand paradigm, it is the strategic partnerships that are the basis for a favorable stability and security—the reliable and committed framework that defines the rule set for the international environment and enforces it or enables others to discipline transgressors. A SOF network is important because it is a means by which issues can be identified early, and relationships and trust built. Strategic partners may participate in the network, but as the British distinction in partnering and strategic partnerships makes clear, the relationships with such partners are more than a network. Strategic partners can be trusted to assume the lead and act in a manner serving a favorable environment. Such strategic partners bring resources that are on par with U.S. contributions—capabilities

that interoperate or supplement and complement those of the United States. A cohort of strategic partners exponentially increases U.S. global security capacity in conventional and special operations forces. BPC's most notable strategic contribution is the cultivation of this cohort.

Such a paradigm shift suggests activities in all five of the above listed environments must be perceived through the lens of the future desired global environment. Ultimately, the cultivation of the proper quality strategic partnerships will provide the efforts and resources necessary to manage the force management issues of all five environments, but for this to occur, the United States must direct its current efforts and resources into identifying and developing appropriate strategic partners. Consequently, every decision and action in any of the environments should look beyond the immediate concerns and consider how it might contribute in positive ways to developing appropriate strategic partnerships. Hence, a SOF Network has immediate strategic value, but it is also a vehicle for furthering the trust and relationships with key members. In this regard, USSOCOM must remember that while in the short term "more" participants may serve a useful purpose in the Network, in the long term, more participants does not equate to a better set of partners. Future success depends on sufficient numbers of enduring strategic partners.

As argued earlier, USSOCOM with its SOF culture and experience is in a unique position to participate in the discussion of potential future strategic partnerships and provide insights to important questions. With an understanding of the global environment, who are the logical candidates for strategic partnership? Who and where are the U.S. strategic partners now? Why? What do they bring to the partnership? Where and with whom does the United States need strategic partnerships in the future? Why? What can they bring to the table? Is BPC appropriate? How must it proceed and how can it be integrated with or prioritized among the challenges of the current environments? USSOCOM must reexamine the idea of partnering and strategic partners and avoid a paradox where building the right partners is the key to success, but the immediate demands looking for expedient solutions consume the needed resources for building the capacity of these right partners. Key BPC efforts must be identified, prioritized, and integrated into all the settings so that the progress of partnering and strategic partnerships is accentuated and new capacity created. Fortunately, much of what SOF




Figure 16. SOF Environmental Framework

already does contribute to partnering, but new initiatives and better focus would enhance progress.

Cautionary Considerations

Experience does not validate inherent assumptions in BPC thinking, such as letting others protect our interests for us, that all that is needed is the right capabilities, or that since they are dependent on our resources they will be responsive to us. Great value can be derived in regard to our interests through BPC, but significant issues and risks also exist. Inadequately considered participation can lead to the slippery slope of over-commitment, create powerful alternatives to the host state, lead to new regional issues, and result in decades-long indeterminate operations that contribute to corruption and unrealized expectations. BPC is a means that must be understood in terms of both the good and the bad outcomes that may result. It must be realistic in its assessment of what potential partners are willing and capable of doing and the consequences of the methods and objectives they pursue as a result of their own culture and interests.¹⁹⁶ There are cautionary considerations in BPC worth summarizing again.

SOF must function in accordance with the legalities of BPC and uphold a posture of legitimacy. Authorities can be an obstacle in BPC, particularly in the gray environment of SOF, but authorities also discipline BPC activities

toward larger political values. As Assistant Secretaries of Defense Michael A. Sheehan and Derek H. Chollet noted in a joint statement to Congress, “The trick is to provide the capabilities to meet the military challenges and to do so in a manner that respects the rule of law and legitimate governments.”¹⁹⁷ Both illegal activities and issues of legitimacy can undo the accomplishments of the best BPC strategy and plan. Understanding the legalities not only precludes missteps but may also allow SOF to tap into underutilized funding.

SOF should be employed where others cannot be used for reasons of security and required expertise and where the returns justify the investment of the resources. While SOF resources need not be idle, they should not be tied down in minimum return investments. As suggested earlier in this mono-

SOF should be employed where others cannot be used for reasons of security and required expertise and where the returns justify the investment of the resources.

graph, BPC has in the past consumed vast resources for little return and any approach must be able to exploit opportunities and counter potential threats.¹⁹⁸

Any SOF approach must stand on three legs in regard to engagement: persistent, tailored, and crisis-ready. The SOF Global Network is an appropriate basis for such a strategic approach as long as the legs are recognized in the network design. The SOF operator remains the critical resource for success in SOF-specific BPC efforts with a focus on two key attributes: regional specialization and the ability to act independently in austere situations.¹⁹⁹ Any expansion or organizational issue that dilutes this unique asset directly affects SOF’s strategic utility and tactical proficiency.

BPC efforts and activities have strategic effects. Any intervention changes the strategic environment and these changes must be anticipated. However, what BPC achieves is often limited, uncontrollable, and surprising since it is interdependent with factors not entirely in the control of the implementers, such as host government intentions, popular support, indigenous abilities, and incongruent and nefarious activities of allies and adversaries. The results of BPC may differ from those anticipated, being less, more, or different. Ironically, overly ambitious end states more often lead to less success by disappointing expectations or overloading a state’s capacity to accept help. Expectations of all may change with success or failure. Mission creep, additional requests, and more political aspirations or populace ones arise. BPC efforts are susceptible to counter activities and chance, both physical

and psychological in nature. BPC efforts can be exploited for purposes of counter interests, propaganda, and corruption. The intentions of BPC efforts can be mistakably or intentionally misconstrued. BPC activities often represent opportunities for financial and political advantage. Consequently, they are highly susceptible to political corruption and criminal activities. Technology is a big obstacle: programs must fit the state and the situation. BPC efforts must be tailored to the client in what they need and what they can achieve—and needs and expectations must be managed in accordance with the realities on the ground.

The forward leaning approach to BPC that SOF logically take has significant risks. First among these is the safety of personnel. Security is a primary concern for any BPC activities. Such activities and the personnel and resources associated with them are logical targets for internal and external actors that oppose U.S. and indigenous government policy or the formation of a strategic partnership. Physical security must be part of any planning process, but information security and potential media spin must also be considered. There is also a risk of being sucked into broader conflicts beyond U.S. security objectives or being caught in local power politics or conflicts. Risk exists in over-committing to a host nation and taking responsibility for issues beyond the scope of U.S. interests and objectives. BPC is a delicate balance of providing enough without overtasking indigenous abilities, taking ownership, or creating unrealistic expectations. In addition, in partnering the United States risks owning what our partners do and say even when we do not directly participate in an action or the host nation policies are not in accordance with our values.²⁰⁰

BPC efforts imply political support of the assisted agent. No matter the intent of the capacity building, whether expedient or seeking a potential strategic partnership, any BPC implies political support of the receiving entity, state or otherwise. Further, support to a state implies support to that state's leader and governing elite. BPC and trust building must be "national" in perspective; all internal actors of a state must develop some degree of trust—the greater the lack of trust, the greater the opportunity for issues. In a similar manner, BPC efforts with non-state actors, such as revolutionaries, implies support of that actor and their current and subsequent policies. The assisting state's legitimacy becomes entangled with that of the supported state or actors. Well-intended and modest BPC activities from a U.S. perspective may also look like encirclement to others. SOF BPC or a "SOF network" may be

perceived differently at state, regional, and global levels by different actors within the state or within the international order.

Fundamental changes may take a long time and so may BPC. Persistence in and sustainability of BPC must survive changing administrations and fickle public opinion. Good strategic communications is imperative in dealing with both. However, applying strategic understanding in deciding on the pursuit of a BPC strategy or plan makes it easier to communicate and justify, and periodically rejustify the efforts. Nonetheless, commitment to a partnering process and BPC is not cast in stone. Strategy is about continuing right choices and persistence in them rather than chance, hope, and inflexibility. It is the interests and strategic logic that justifies BPC. If circumstances invalidate the logic, it is time to move on to a new strategy or other issues.

USSOCOM has reembraced the indirect approach and revalidated the need for direct action. Its strategic outlook recognizes the importance of BPC and advocates a number of supportive SOF initiatives to enhance strategic performance. While controversy surrounds some of these efforts, the strategic logic is sound, and issues should be able to be resolved appropriately through more effective communication and collaboration with lawmakers, policymakers, and other military commanders as security demands make the needs more evident.²⁰¹ However, USSOCOM must continue to examine the implications of the paradigm shift and adapt to the implications inherent to it.

8. Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, the emerging 21st century global order has been challenged by instability and the threat of instability resulting from numerous causes: natural disasters, internal conflicts, transnational issues, and chronic and overwhelming societal problems founded in ethnicity, religion, economic challenges, poor governance, and the uneven and unanticipated effects of globalization. As a result, a significant number of fragile or failed states emerged or became more apparent as the bipolar struggle subsided. Even well-developed states have been challenged by the magnitude of these issues or their transnational nature.

The continuing instability is a threat to U.S. security and economic well-being. For many of these troubled states, humanitarian and traditional security assistance, while essential in the immediate term, is not sufficient. The challenges require U.S. whole of government and comprehensive global solutions to nation assistance. Further, an emerging strategic insight for governments and assistance communities over the last two decades is that providing the immediate capabilities that a host nation needs is not enough; the best resolution is to assist the host nation to build its capacity and resilience so that it can better deal with its own current and any future problems, and potentially assist others with theirs. Building partnership capacity is the right strategic concept for addressing 21st century issues of state failure, global stability, and national security. The emerging United States grand strategy rests on this premise.

The favorable world order sought by the United States and most other modern states is dependent on a collective body of successful states in positive political and economic competition. Such a world order raises the social well-being of the world's peoples and closes the seams in domestic and international order that allow terrorist, insurgent, criminal, and other malevolent actors to flourish and create disruptive levels of instability. Inherent within the modern environment of change and positive competition is a degree of risk of a strategic setback for all states.

The international order and its leading powers must insure participating states against such setbacks to sustain a favorable balance of like-minded states and a relatively stable environment. Some promise of state capacity

building or rebuilding is implicit in such a guarantee. A U.S. grand strategic concept of BPC best contributes to successful states and assures a base of strategic international partners—states that are willing partners in maintaining a world order favorable to U.S. interests. However, to be successful, such a strategy must be founded in strategic purpose, understanding of the global and local environments, and the art and practice of partnering and partnership. With such a foundation, the BPC enterprise achieves strategic focus in place and time, and the BPC mechanisms act holistically and in concert to support national interests appropriately.

USSOCOM and SOF are essential elements in a BPC concept for the emerging 21st century U.S. grand strategy. Unsurprisingly, USSOCOM and much of SOF are among the early adapters to the evolving strategy with renewed emphasis on indirect approaches, changes in professional development, and initiatives such as the SOF Network. However, the 21st century environment and SOF's importance in the success of the grand BPC concept demand much more of the SOF community. The 2012 *Defense Strategic Guidance* foreshadows this by its reliance on SOF. This monograph seeks to broaden SOF's aperture on the emerging grand strategy, understanding and partnerships, BPC as a strategic concept with its supporting mechanisms, and how SOF might further think about the implications of the evolving grand strategy and the shift to a 21st century paradigm.↑

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